




UNIVERSITETET I
NORDLAND

Maritime activity, risks and international preparedness partnership in the High North

-results from the MARPART project

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Presentation outline

1. Introduction: General description of the MARPART project
2. Increased commercial activity in the High North: estimated level up to 2025
3. Risk assessment in Norway
4. Challenges of management structures and partnership in joint maritime operations in the Arctic
5. Conclusions



1.

M A R P A R T

MARITIME INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP IN THE HIGH NORTH



1. Increase knowledge on future maritime **activity level** in the High North and **threats**
2. Increase understanding of **future tasks and the demands** for the preparedness system
3. Provide analytical concepts for **coordination** in **cross-border**, emergency task force operations
4. Contribute with organizational concepts for
 - inter-organizational **partnership**
 - **management** of joint, cross-border operations
5. Create **competence networks**

Research group:

- Cross-disciplinary research group from four countries
- Fifteen professors plus PhD (doctoral)-students and Master-students
- Nine universities participating:
 - The University of Nordland
 - UiT-the University of Tromsø
 - UNIS-The University Center of Svalbard
 - The University of Greenland
 - The Norwegian Police University College
 - The Norwegian Defense University College
 - The University of Iceland
 - The Northern (Arctic) Federal University, Arkhangelsk, Russia
 - MSTU -The Murmansk State Technical University, Russia
- Adjoined partners:
 - World Maritime University, Malmo, Denmark and Greenland Police Academy, Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, The Norwegian Fire Academy, Royal Norwegian Naval Academy



Funding

- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- The Nordland County Administration, Norway
- The University of Nordland
- Research partners




2. INCREASED COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IN THE HIGH NORTH



The broad range of activities

- Coastal transport – more intra-regional and transits in all sea regions
- Intercontinental Arctic routes – stable transits, but increased interest
- Fisheries – further north along the ice ridge, engine power of fishing fleet is increasing
- Petroleum activity – further north and east(west), more installations, more pipelines, more transportation vessels
- Maritime tourism – further north and east, increased popularity of explorer tourism
- Government (research, military) – increased activity in more remote areas





Future activity scenarios up to 2025

HIGH SCENARIO

↑ - increase, ≡ - without significant changes

LOW SCENARIO

| | RUSSIA | NORWAY | ICELAND |
|-------------------|--------|--------|---------|
| Coastal fleet | ↑ | ↑ | ↑ |
| Intercont. routes | ↑ | ↑ | ≡ |
| Fishing | ↑ | ↑ | ↑ |
| Petroleum | ↑ | ↑ | ↑ |
| Tourism | ↑ | ↑ | ↑ |
| Research | ↑ | ↑ | ↑ |

| | RUSSIA | NORWAY | ICELAND |
|-------------------|--------|--------|---------|
| Coastal fleet | ↑ | ↑ | ↑ |
| Intercont. routes | ≡ | ≡ | ≡ |
| Fishing | ≡ | ≡ | ↑ |
| Petroleum | ≡ | ↑ | ≡ |
| Tourism | ≡ | ≡ | ≡ |
| Research | ↑ | ↑ | ≡ |



3. RISK ASSESSMENTS



Dominating risk factors

- Remoteness, ice, polar lows, cold and unpredictable weather
- Reduced visibility, fog, darkness in winter
- Limited infrastructure with necessary resources
- Limited/unstable satellite communication



Norway sea areas: more than 500 accidents a year:

| | Tourist/ Cruise ship | Cargo/tanker/ petroleum Rigs/floaters | Fishing |
|--|-------------------------|---|---------|
| Grounding | T-G | C-G | F-G |
| Damage due to collision (sea ice and other) | T-I | C-I | F-I |
| Fire | T-F | C-F | F-F |
| Violence/terror | T-V | C-V | F-V |
| Other reasons | T-O | C-O | F-O |



Environmental Risks in Coastal Norway

| | | | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------|-------|----------|-------------|----------|
| 5 - Frequently | | | | | |
| 4 - Relatively frequently | | F-G | | | |
| 3 - Occurs | | F-F | | C-F | C-G |
| 2 – Very Rare | | | T-F | | T-G |
| 1 – Theoretically possible | | F-V | | | T-V, C-V |
| | insignificant | minor | moderate | significant | Serious |



Human Risks in Coastal Norway

| | | | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------|-------|----------|---------------|---------|
| 5 – Frequently | | | | | |
| 4 - Relatively frequently | | | | F-G | |
| 3 – Occurs | | | | C-G, C-F, F-F | T-F |
| 2 – Very Rare | | | | | T-G |
| 1 – Theoretically possible | | | | C-V, F-V | T-V |
| | insignificant | minor | moderate | significant | serious |



Environmental Risks in Svalbard area

| | | | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------|----------|------------------|-----------------------|---------|
| 5 - Frequently | | | | | |
| 4 - Relatively frequently | | F-G | | | |
| 3 - Occurs | | F-I | T-I, T-G | | |
| 2 – Very Rare | | F-O, F-F | T-O, | C-O, C-I, T-F, C-F | |
| 1 – Theoretically possible | | | F-V, C-V, T-V | C-G, | |
| | insignificant | minor | moderate | significant | serious |



Human Risks in Svalbard area

| | | | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------|-------|---------------|-------------|----------|
| 5 - Frequently | | | | | |
| 4 - Relatively frequently | | F-G | | | |
| 3 - Occurs | | F-I | | T-I, T-G | |
| 2 – Very Rare | | F-O | C-O, C-I, T-O | F-F | T-F, C-F |
| 1 – Theoretically possible | | | C-G | F-V, C-V | T-V |
| | insignificant | minor | moderate | significant | serious |



High risk and increasing activity means that the Arctic countries are in need of a very capable maritime preparedness system – cooperation and effective host nation support are crucial.



4. CHALLENGES OF COOPERATION IN JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE ARCTIC



Challenges of the operational context of the Arctic

- Scarce resources: limited amount and reduced functionality;
- High volatility: difficulties with the system functionality, lack of understanding of the cause-effect relations;
- Multi-nationality: different cultures, languages and geopolitical interests; focus on cross-border relations;
- High complexity: a very complicated set of formal institutions and large number of stakeholders.




Example: Operative actors in preparedness system of Norway

| | Institutional ownership: | | Preparedness area: | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|---------|--------------------|--------|
| Operativ aktører: | Ministries and owners | Directorate | Search & Resc. | Fire fight. | Salvage | Pollution Recovery | Terror |
| Joint Rescue Coordination Centres | Ministry of Justice (JD) | | X | X | X | | |
| Rescue helicopters | Ministry of Defence FD | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Police | JD | PDir | X | x | X | x | X |
| Fire and rescue corps | JD | DSB | | | | | |
| Coastal authority | Min. of Transp. TD | | X | X | X | X | |
| Coast Guard | FD | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Joint Mil HQ | FD | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Health regions | Min of Health (HD) | Hdir | X | | | | |
| BarentsWatch | TD | | X | X | X | X | |
| Municipalities | Min of mun. | | X | X | | X | |
| SAR coastal vessels | Private | | X | X | X | X | |
| NOFO Joint oil recovery organisation | Oil companies | Ptil | | | | X | |
| Oil companies | Field owners | Ptil | X | X | X | X | X |




Example: ICS (Incident Command System)

basic organization structure



Operational-tactical management in joint sea operations



How to deal with organizational complexity?

- A broad range of capacities and coordination resources;
- Transparent organization structure;
- Matching competence, training and equipment of different institutions involved;
- Availability and transparent procedures for use of joint resources;
- Dynamic capabilities in command structure for creativity, improvisation and innovation;
- Common language platform and cultural understanding/trust;
- Removal of institutional barriers (approval, border crossing, transport).



Challenges of standard operating procedures in turbulent environment

| BENEFITS | WEAKNESSES |
|---|--|
| A standardized way to coordinate a set of organizations who may otherwise work together sporadically. | Lower coordination in situation of low pre-existing trust between agencies. |
| Is scalable and allows overall flexibility in expertise and in range of organizations. | Weak in inter-organizational coordination and levels of government responding to disaster. |
| Comprehensive resource management procedures ensure visibility of all resources and their mobilization | The emphasis on formal organizations fails to recognize need for transformations of the structure and functions of the established organizations during the response. |
| Incident action plans reduces freelancing and ensures a coordinated response. | Many social demands produced by disasters are too complex and unexpected to be handled by the standard command system. |
| Uses the same pre-defined facilities nomenclature and roles description, also during large multi-func events | Lack of experience and knowledge transfer from high volatility environments like at sea and in the Arctic |



5. CONCLUSIONS



Conclusions

- The maritime activity level in the High North is becoming more complex
- Need to be prepared with adequate, well-trained and well-organized cross-border emergency task forces
- Larger accidents need mobilization of resources across institution and country borders
- Preparedness and emergency capabilities have to be highlighted and balanced at all levels of management
- Turbulence has to be met with new managerial concepts



Thank You
for your attention

