# THESIS

## The role of control in shaping dialogue in participatory budgeting: case study of the city of Kyiv

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**Abstract**

Modern representative democracies are in the crisis of representative politics. In order to deal with this crisis, authorities are seeking for new democratic tools of citizens' engagement in the decision-making process, based on the dialogue. Participatory budgeting (PB) is the example of such an accounting tool which is vital for promoting democracy and dialogue rhetoric. However, the effectiveness of PB cannot be taken for granted, and some challenges are observed in different cases. Interestingly, despite plenty of literature regarding PB challenges, there is also an acknowledgement that dialogue and democratic means of PB should somehow be controlled, steered and framed. However, there is not so much written about the control/steering dimension in PB.

The purpose of this study is to contribute to the existing literature on PB, regarding its dialogue and control dimensions. It answers the question of what kind of control is exercised in the PB process and how it shapes PB dialogic means. To answer this question, I use/mobilise the dialogue literature (Rajala & Laihonen, 2019) and Simon's Levers of control (LOC) (Simons, 1995). Empirically, based on interviews, documentality analysis and observations, I examine the PB process in the city of Kyiv (Ukraine) as a case study.

Examining the dialogic and control dimensions of PB on the case of Kyiv, I have obtained interesting results, which are contrary to the expectations and assumptions of PB literature. Findings demonstrate that despite the dialogic rhetoric of PB it seems that in the case of Kyiv it is not about dialogue, but more about some kind of quasi-market or game where citizens participate in the competition for winning their city initiatives/projects. As my observations reveal, interestingly, there were several different ways of how control shapes the dialogic dimensions of the PB process in Kyiv. Different actors in the PB process exercised boundary, interactive and beliefs systems of control. The presence of control, in some cases, limits the dialogue and creates a monologic situation. At the same time, quite paradoxically, there are situations where the existence of such control

helps to sustain dialogue rather than limits it. Also, the case of Kyiv outlines the situations where there has been lack of control, and it limited the dialogue, such as usage of PB for the personal gain, conflict of interests, lobbying, lack of time for authorities for verification of projects and others. There should be some sort of control in order to avoid such issues and to sustain dialogue.

With these findings, the thesis has several contributions. By showing different ways how control shapes and sometimes not shape the dialogic means of PB, the thesis contributes to PB literature in general and recent calls to understand relations between control and dialogue in particular. Specifically, it is shown that some elements of control limit dialogue, but at the same time, some of them can be fruitful and sustain dialogue in PB. Moreover, absence or lack of control may lead to the point where there is no dialogue but a monologue. My practical contribution is that practitioners should be aware of how they apply the control dimension into the PB process in order to avoid unintended outcomes.

**Keywords:** participatory budgeting, dialogue, control, participants, a case study of Kyiv, elements of dialogue, Simons' levers of control.

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# Content

# List of acronyms

BCU – Budget Code of Ukraine

KCC – Kyiv City Council

KCSA – Kyiv City State Administration

LOC - Levers of Control

PB – Participatory Budgeting

## 1. Introduction

Many scholars have observed social, political and economic changes in Western representative democracies that have significantly influenced the relationship between citizens and government in the last decades (Schneider & Busse, 2019). Furthermore, trend to the reduction of trust for the government and other political institutions (Volodin, 2019), widening legitimacy gap between citizens and government (Brun-Martos & Lapsley, 2017), dramatic decrease in voter turnout and involvement of citizens into the politics (Siaroff, 2009) reviled that the current democracies are in the crisis of representative politics (Fung, 2006; Tormey, 2015). That is why citizens seek new ways of being heard and having more power for influencing the decision-making process. Nowadays, there are many attempts to reinvent the public sector, both in developing and emerging countries (van Helden & Uddin, 2016). In order to deal with the crisis, governments have been forced to invent new tools of citizens' engagement in the decision-making process, based on deliberation and collaboration (Fung, 2015).

The example of such an accounting tool is participatory budgeting (PB), which can strengthen democracy through deliberation. Even though PB is one of the most popular tools in the public sector (Sintomer, Herzberg, & Röcke, 2008), it is adopted differently in a variety of cases. In general, under PB we understand the process, when unelected citizens have a chance to be involved in deliberation on the allocation of part of the local budget funds, that may result in the creation of new mechanisms of accountability. PB, as a dialogic tool, has a lot of rhetoric with its fundamental values of social justice, democratic legitimacy and effectiveness (Fung, 2015).

However, despite all of this positive rhetoric, many scholars acknowledge that PB effectiveness cannot be taken for granted, and some negative issues may arise (Bartocci, Grossi, & Mauro, 2019). It seems that there is a mismatch between PB rhetoric and practices observed. PB practices may end up: with developing

only symbolic social justice (Harun, Van-Peursem, & Eggleton, 2015; Uddin, Gumb, & Kasumba, 2011), with monologue (Aleksandrov, Bourmistrov, & Grossi, 2018), with symbolic implementation (Aleksandrov & Timoshenko, 2018; Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016), and with only strengthening existing inequalities (Bourdieu, 2004). Moreover, there is a lack of willingness to participate in PB process from both citizens and authorities observed in many different cases (Rodgers, 2005; Uddin et al., 2011; Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016), as well as lack of technical and analytical skills for successful implementation (Wampler, 2000).

Wide variety of theories were used to examine PB and its challenges, including all branches of institutional theory (Aleksandrov et al., 2018; Bartocci et al., 2019), actor-network theory (Aleksandrov & Timoshenko, 2018), political science theory (Rodgers, 2005), and others. Even though all of them have different aspects to cover, it seems that there is a common acknowledgement that dialogue and democratic means of PB should somehow be controlled, steered and framed. Although there is quite a lot of literature about PB, implementation of it, its rhetoric, positive and negative outcomes, and its problematic nature, there is not so much written about the control and steering dimension in PB. In this regard, the thesis intends to understand the role and the meaning of control dimension in the PB and its influence on its dialogic potential. The specific research question is: *"What kind of control is exercised in the PB process and how it shapes PB dialogic means?"*.

In order to answer this question, I combine ideas from control literature using the Simons' LOC framework (Simons, 1995; Tessier & Otley, 2012) and dialogue literature (Rajala & Laihonen, 2019). Even though the concept of control is quite ambiguous (Tessier & Otley, 2012), for this master thesis, the 'steering' definition is used based on the Simons (1995) LOC framework, and all the levers from his framework may be applied for the PB agenda.

This thesis is a qualitative study, which empirically is based on the case of the capital of Ukraine, which is Kyiv. The case was chosen as Ukraine is an example of a country with a transitional economy (Kvartiuk, 2015) and with a crisis of representative democracy and where there are attempts to reinvent democracy (Nodia, Cenuşă, & Minakov, 2017). The case of Kyiv is particularly interesting for investigation due to its scope (more than 150 thousand participants in 2018), innovativeness (use of online platforms) and dialogic rhetoric of PB with many actors involved (citizens, NGOs, public managers and others). That made the democratic means of PB extremely complex to handle with, therefore, meaning that some steering/control mechanisms supposed to appear. Moreover, as van Helden and Uddin (2016) said there is a lack of research on the recent developments in the public sector accounting and budgeting in the developing countries. I have taken ten interviews, made several observations and made a documentary analysis.

The remainder of the thesis is structured in the following way. The next chapter of the thesis will be PB literature review and theoretical ideas used. Further follows by methodology section, where the information about philosophical background, research design, data collection and analysis are presented. Then I present my empirical findings regarding the elements of the dialogue and the control dimension and discussion of it. The research ends with conclusions and prepositions for future research.

## 2. Literature review and theory

In this literature review, in order to be more conscious of the theoretical ambition of contributions in this section, I make a distinction between domain theory and method theory (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014). Domain theory is knowledge about PB as a democratic tool and its main challenges, including a mismatch between rhetoric and practice (Figure 1). Moreover, method theory is a dialogic framework (Rajala & Laihonen, 2019) together with Simons' LOC (Simons, 1995) as a meta-level conceptual system, which can offer alternative perspectives

and add new valuable understanding into domain theory. In the next paragraphs, I use empirical data with the reflection on domain theory.

Domain theory

Basic knowledge about PB, it's rhetoric and challenges

Research gap

Empirical findings

Control in PB

Case study of Kyiv

Dialogic management framework and levers of control

Methodology

Method theory

**Figure 1. Domain and method theory**

## 2.1 PB as an element of democracy improvement, its rhetoric and practice

There is a search for new accounting mechanisms that can reinvent democracy, dialogue, and new participatory forms of organisation (Bebbington, Brown, Frame, & Thomson, 2007; Brown, Dillard, & Hopper, 2015). In the public sector, an excellent example of such an accounting tool is PB. It is undoubtedly one of the most popular and widespread accounting innovation (Sintomer, Herzberg, & Röcke, 2012) which has become central participatory mechanism used by local governments for at least past decade (Fung, 2015). So far there is no exclusive definition of PB because it has travelled throughout a world and in every different case, it has a specific model of implementation (Bartocci et al., 2019; Krenjova, 2017). In general, PB is a specific approach to budgeting in which unelected citizens negotiate with each other and with government officials, usually in organised meetings, in defining policies to be funded and on what

projects (hospitals, schools, roads, and others) to allocate resources (Bartocci et al., 2019; Célérier & Botey, 2015; Sintomer et al., 2008; Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016).

PB practices can combine aspects of representative democracy, which already exists and direct democracy, which is created by PB (Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016). Fung (2015) emphasise that when there is a democratic legitimacy issue, and the relationship between political institutions and citizens is weak, PB can be a tool for resolving those issues. Moreover, as Baiocchi and Ganuza (2014) state main objectives of PB are not just improved policing or transparency *'but bringing to life practices that were both prefigurative of the societies we want and also part of a strategy for achieving that society'*.

Since the Brazilian case of Porto Alegre in 1989, PB began to spread all over the world on four continents and was adopted both in developed and developing countries (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). Nowadays, there are more than 2500 cases identified all over the world (Gilman, 2016). After the success of Porto Alegrian case, PB has spread throughout Brazil, later on, hundreds of municipalities in Latin American countries such as Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Uruguay, Ecuador, Peru, Dominican Republic and other countries in the region implemented PB (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014; Rodgers, 2005). After implementation in Latin American countries, PB has travelled north to North America and Europe. There are dozens of predominantly successful examples of PB in Europe in countries like UK, Italy, Spain, Germany, France and Portugal (Allegretti & Herzberg, 2004; Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014; Bartocci et al., 2019; Schneider & Busse, 2019).

PB itself has a lot of rhetoric, especially regarding the dialogue between citizens and authorities (Brown, 2009) and positive outcomes, revealed by many scholars (Cooper, Bryer, & Meek, 2006; Hadden & Lerner, 2011; Lerner, 2011). Some studies define that PB has a potential to establish new democratic agenda and new mechanisms of accountability, improve citizen control and strengthen

their trust in government, enhance legitimacy of government decisions and actions, increase transparency of government, promote fairer, more efficient and more comprehensive decision-making, and foster social justice (Abers, 2000; Cooper et al., 2006; Hadden & Lerner, 2011; Kuruppu et al., 2016; Rodgers, 2005; Wampler, 2000). Furthermore, Célérier and Botey (2015) reveal that those citizens who were marginalised before the PB have a chance to become a part of the elite during the process of PB execution. Besides, PB is expected to serve as a mediating tool between the government and democratic accountability of it (Brun-Martos & Lapsley, 2017; Bryer, 2014).

As for developing countries, international organisations promoted the implementation of PB, especially in Africa (Ethiopia, Ghana, Uganda, Mauritius and others) and Asia (Kasozi-Mulindwa, 2013; Uddin & Hopper, 2003). During the last decade, PB has travelled to developing countries in Eastern Europe, among which Czech Republic, Poland, Ukraine, Russia and other countries can be defined (Aleksandrov & Timoshenko, 2018; Polko, 2015; Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016; Volodin, 2014, 2019). Noteworthy that PB seems to be boundlessly adaptable to the most diverse context and is suitable for the most distinguished political conditions with its rhetoric (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014).

Despite PB rhetoric, an increasing number of scholars are not that optimistic about the democratic promises and effectiveness of PB; they indicate that some challenges may also appear (Aleksandrov & Timoshenko, 2018; Bartocci et al., 2019). PB having dialogic rhetoric in the beginning can end up with monologue (Aleksandrov et al., 2018; Harun et al., 2015), with entirely ceremonial implementation (Aleksandrov & Timoshenko, 2018; Uddin, Mori, & Adhikari, 2017; Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016) and with only symbolic changes on existing inequalities (Bourdieu, 2004). In some contexts, PB has even undermined the previously existed trust between citizens and politicians (Michels & De Graaf, 2010). Irvin and Stansbury (2004) claim that no matter what method of

communication (e.g. public meetings, focus groups, etc.) was used the unrepresentativeness and poor attendance of budget meetings have been observed.

Rodgers (2005) reveals that there is a lack of willingness to participate in PB from both citizens and authorities. Similar observations have been made by Velinov and Kuruppu (2016) in the Czech Republic, where people often avoid the direct participation citing the cultural conditions (laziness of most of the citizens), and where the dominance of political parties and massive resistance of Mayor on the adoption of PB have undervalued it. Uddin et al. (2017) define that in the case of Japan the poor citizen engagement and lack of political participation are since local cultural conditions have not been taken into account while transferring such accounting tool as PB to the Japanese context. Russian experience of PB shows that symbolic implementation of PB and ignorance have led to a decrease in democratic legitimacy (Aleksandrov & Kuznetcova, 2015). Moreover, in some cases, both citizens and politicians lack analytical and technical skills that can undermine the successful implementation of PB (Wampler, 2000), and limits the influence of citizens on a budget because of domination of technical experts (Célérier & Botey, 2015; Fung, 2006; Hong, 2015).

Therefore, it seems that there is a strong mismatch between the rhetoric of PB and practices observed. This mismatch has been explained in different ways using different theories. For example, some scholars use political science theories, such as Bordieusian framework, showing that political elites do not want to give their power to the citizens (Célérier & Botey, 2015). Some are reflecting on neo-institutional aspects including institutional work and reflexivity trap (Aleksandrov et al., 2018), institutional logics, stating that administrative logic is dominating in the case of China (He, 2011) and political logic is dominating in the case of Italy (Bartocci et al., 2019). Issue of non-human actors role that limited democratic potential of PB using actor-network theory is examined (Aleksandrov & Timoshenko, 2018). Rogers' theory of diffusion is used to explain the introduction

of PB (Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016); and cultural theory is used for examining the importance of local context in introducing of PB in Japan (Uddin et al., 2017).

There has been plenty of research about the key dimensions of PB (Beckett & King, 2002), as well as the wide range of implementation approaches of PB have been analysed (G. J. Miller & Evers, 2002). The PB practice's design and factors that influence the PB initiation and consequences of its implementation (Abdel-Monem, Herian, Hoppe, PytlikZillig, & Tomkins, 2016; Brun-Martos & Lapsley, 2017; Sintomer et al., 2008) together with the role of emancipatory potential of PB in creation of substantial social change (Célérier & Botey, 2015) have been examined. Several studies have investigated the development of actors' logic during the adoption and implementation of PB (Bartocci et al., 2019), the role of human and non-human actors in translation of PB to the local context (Aleksandrov & Timoshenko, 2018), and the role played by consultants, politicians, managers in shaping dialogic potential of PB (Aleksandrov et al., 2018).

Notwithstanding all these research papers, it seems that there is some increasing acknowledgement that dialogue and democratic means of PB should be translated into public sector realities. Inevitably PB should somehow be designed, framed and controlled, since it becomes more and more issue of not politicians, but public managers and public administration. So far, not so many scholars try to reflect how it is possible to bring dialogic means of PB into sort of control dimension of public administration by public managers because in most cases we have some managers who will design and who will lead all these processes of participation. However, there is not so much understanding of how they frame their decisions on what is essential to control and how; what control to exercise? And this actually goes in line with recent calls of Aleksandrov et al. (2018) who state that it would be interesting to study how much control is needed in order to sustain healthy and balanced dialogue between involved actors who are used to act in a monologic way (Brown & Dillard, 2015a,b).

## 2.2 PB from the perspective of dialogue and control as a method theory

Inevitably some kind of a merger between dialogue and control in PB is needed. All scholars agree that dialogue is the central part of PB. However, not so many researches are theorising the elements of PB dialogue, only Aleksandrov et al. (2018) and Uddin et al. (2017) write about it, but from the dialogic-monologic perspective. There are other researchers Rajala and Laihonen (2019), who have defined six elements of dialogue based on the management perspective. In their research paper, Rajala and Laihonen (2019) propose a definition of dialogue, define elements of it and develop the concept of dialogic performance management. Using the narrative analysis, they reveal that managerial choices shape the dialogic management and define whether it is based on the monologue or dialogue. For this research, I integrate their model, which consist of six elements of dialogue into the paradigm of PB, combining it with the concept of control, as these elements should somehow be framed. My model is based on the elements of a dialogue defined by them but translating them to the context of PB (Table 1).

**Table 1. Elements of the dialogue in PB (adapted from Rajala and Laihonen (2019))**

| Elements of the dialogue | Characteristic |
|---|---|
| Dialogue has a purpose | PB dialogue purpose should be promoting civic engagement, active participation, governance and new forms of democracies (Célérier & Botey, 2015; Cooper et al., 2006; Hadden & Lerner, 2011; Rodgers, 2005). |
| Dialogue has a topic | PB dialogue should be concentrated on the forming of part of budget expenditures, on what projects (topics) to spend it - hospitals, schools, roads, or others (Bartocci et al., 2019; Sintomer et al., 2008; Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016). |

| Dialogue has participants | All people, including managers, consultants, members of NGOs and citizens, should participate in PB dialogue (Célérier & Botey, 2015). However, in practice lack of citizens participation is observed (Rodgers, 2005; Uddin et al., 2017; Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016), as well as the dominance of politicians (Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016) and NGOs (Aleksandrov et al., 2018) on the PB dialogue. |
|---|---|
| Dialogue has a time span | Dialogue demands time (Bohm, 2013), takes time (Yankelovich, 2001), is an ongoing process (Brown & Dillard, 2015b), and attaches to budgeting timetable (Aleksandrov et al., 2018). Less research is done about the time dimension in PB; however, dialogue should continue throughout the whole budgeting process. |
| Dialogue has a forum | Dialogue in PB should be designed as face-to-face open meetings (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014) and needs a shared space (Banathy & Jenlink, 2005). |
| Dialogue is based upon a dialogue method (i.e. code of behaviour) | Dialogue in PB should give the possibility for everybody to speak and foster healthy democracy with deliberation (Bingham, Nabatchi, & O'Leary, 2005). However, a bunch of studies show that it is not happening (Aleksandrov & Timoshenko, 2018; Uddin et al., 2017; Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016). |

The concept of control is quite ambiguous and different scholars define it in a completely different way (Malmi & Brown, 2008; Tessier & Otley, 2012). It becomes even more problematic to understand when we talk about democracy. What is the place of control in fruitful democracy? For this thesis, Simons (1995) framework is used to define control. Even though Simons' LOC framework has been criticised in the past decades for having ambiguous and vague definitions

(Tessier & Otley, 2012), it is still widely used. His study conceptualises control as four levers that can be used to "steer" – diagnostic control, beliefs, boundary and interactive control systems (Simons, 1995). It seems that each of the LOC can be exercised regarding the elements of dialogue. In my research, I try to capture what levers are exercised for each of the six elements of dialogue.

Beliefs systems are the broad set of definitions that managers use to communicate with employees. These systems are used in order to draw the attention of the employees to the key credos of the organisation, that are concerned with the creation of value, the desirable level of performance and managing internal and external relationships (Simons, 1995). Reflecting on PB, it can be seen in the paper of He (2011) who studied the Chinese case, where the whole process was primarily influenced and reshaped by the Chinese government in order to meet their specific needs. The case was studied through the perspective of the institutional logics and domination of the administrative logic, rather than through beliefs systems of control. However, in his case, as a result, this chosen approach driven by the government control limited empowering of citizens through PB.

Boundary systems are based on the management principle called *'power of negative system'* (Simons, 1995, p. 84). The main idea of these systems is to set up the list of things employees should *not* do, for example, by establishing a code of conduct. Reflecting on PB, it can be that there are lots of templates, frames, guidelines, best practices on how to implement PB and what should be avoided. There are lots of cases in Africa and Asia where the whole implementation process of PB was supervised by international organisations or by donor countries and was based on the templates (Kasozi-Mulindwa, 2013; Uddin & Hopper, 2003). However, the results of such implementation in most cases were not successful.

Interactive control systems are *'formal information systems that managers use to involve themselves regularly and personally in the decision activities of subordinates'* (Simons, 1995, p. 86). The attention is focused on particular issues,

facilitating new ideas and opportunities, creating dialogue and stimulating learning (Adler & Chen, 2011; Ferreira & Otley, 2009). Reflecting on PB, it can be seen in the paper of Uddin et al. (2017), wherein the case of Japan the whole process has been led by political parties who have been shaping the whole process. Also, the Czech Republic case study by Velinov and Kuruppu (2016), where the Mayor plays a critical role and have been against the introduction of PB and have tried to avoid the implementation of PB.

Diagnostic control systems are information systems used by managers in order to monitor the outcomes of the organisation activity, that help them to correct deviations from pre-set targets (Simons, 1995). They are used to decrease the burden of managers of constant controlling. Diagnostic controls represent controls that only take place when there are deviations from the established targets (Ferreira & Otley, 2009). Reflecting on PB, it can be seen in lots of cases, where the public managers or those responsible for PB process have been changing something in the PB process in order to increase the positive outcomes of PB.

Thus, in this section, key theoretical perspectives of PB have been outlined. PB, as a democratic tool and its main challenges, including a mismatch between rhetoric and practice, has been defined as a domain theory. In the understanding of PB rhetoric and practice, there is the call to define control dimension in PB. The gap which I address in the domain theory is the relation between dialogic means of PB and the role of control. In this regard, PB is viewed as the element that consists of six elements of dialogue based on Rajala and Laihonen (2019) framework combining it with the control literature, in particular, Simons' LOC (Simons, 1995) which constitute the method theory of this thesis. In other words, I try to capture each aspect of the dialogue from the perspective of control. After getting the perceptions of control of these related elements of the dialogue from actors involved in PB practices, I compare the results with the model presented in Table 1.

## 3. Methodology

The method or combination of methods that researchers use in order to conduct the research is profoundly affected by the aim of the research (P. Johnson & Duberley, 2000). In this chapter of the thesis, philosophical assumptions, as well as an overview of research methods and techniques of data gathering used during the research, are presented. In order to answer the research question of this paper, the qualitative research method has been used. The consideration of validity and reliability issues as well as ethical aspects concerning obtaining and interpretation of the empirical data are presented at the end of the chapter. Timeframes of this research are presented in Appendix A.

### 3.1 Philosophical background of the research

In order to write a scientific paper, the researcher needs to be aware of his philosophical assumptions (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2015). Philosophical traditions in science determine how the research work is constructed. According to Burrell (1979), philosophy of science concern about the variety of ways of understanding the world (Ontology), how knowledge can be best acquired (Epistemology), and if people are ruled by external influences (human nature).

There are three leading philosophical positions presented to study social sciences: internal realism, nominalism and relativism (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015, p. 140). The internal realism position assumes that there is a single reality, but it is impossible for scientists to access the reality directly, and the researcher can only get the indirect evidence on what is happening on fundamental physical processes (Putnam, 1987). From the nominalist ontology, there is no truth and facts are created by a human (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015, p. 141). The relativism position considers that different people can experience the phenomenon in different way and facts depend on their viewpoint (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015).

The topic of my study, PB, refers to social science research, where the behaviour of people, rather than examination of objects are studied. In the case of

my research, various viewpoints on the control of the dialogue in PB of different involved actors exist. As Collins (1983, p. 88) says *'what counts for the truth can vary from place to place and from time to time'.* The diversity of opinions of actors involved in the PB process can lead to the point where each of them may have his or her way of thinking on the control dimension of dialogue in PB. Consequently, I admit that the views of the actors presented in this thesis primarily refer to personal perceptions of the subject of research.

The nature of the chosen topic widely influenced the epistemological approach choice, which considered the ontological foundation. There are two different theoretical attitudes of how social science research should be performed: positivism and social constructionism (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). There are lots of philosophical assumptions and methodologies linked to each position. However, there is no single philosopher, who is using only one particular view (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). The core idea of positivism is the external existence of the social world, and its properties are measured through objective methods and are independent of social actors. Social constructionism relates to the group of approaches connected with interpretive methods (Habermas, 1970). The main essence of social constructionism is that the aspects of social reality are determined by the people, but not by objective or external factors (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015).

It is quite challenging to define a philosophical position as pure positivism or social constructionism; the combination of these paradigms is usually used. In my research I define my philosophical position closer to social constructionism, the idea of which is the focus on the people perceptions of the world – primarily through sharing their experience through the means of language (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Shotter, 1993). As Easterby-Smith et al. (2015) mention the task of the social constructionism researcher should not be to collect facts and measure the frequency of specific patterns but to acknowledge the different constructions and meanings that individuals place upon their experience. Using the chosen

epistemology, I try to investigate and evaluate the perceptions of different actors involved in the PB practice.

## 3.2 Research Design

Taking into account my philosophical position and the fact that in this research data is in the form of words, the qualitative research method is applied. Qualitative research is based on multiple meanings of individual experiences, that are constructed socially and historically, and has an intent to contribute to the theory (Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann, & Hanson, 2003). Under this research method the reality is viewed as socially constructed phenomena that give a comprehensive insight into the concepts and is based on what people think, do and what they are often unaware of (Forsythe, 1999). Data is collected through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, documents, tools, and other artefacts (Klein & Myers, 1999). Qualitative research design is used when the aim is to understand what is happening with phenomena, gaining new insights and shedding new light on it (Stoop & Berg, 2003).

There are several different ways to design research: descriptive, explorative and causal. Using a descriptive research design, the author aims to describe the characteristics of the phenomenon studied with the usage of collected data. Even though this research design provides factual, accurate and systematic data, the research cannot be used to describe the things that caused the situation (Mitchell & Jolley, 2007). Another approach is an exploratory research which is applied to study the phenomenon that has not been clearly defined (Mitchell & Jolley, 2007). Exploratory research often relies on qualitative methods, such as in-depth interviews and analysis of secondary sources of data. This approach is used to provide new insights into the phenomenon and answer the why, how, and what questions (Mason, 2006). Causal research or explanatory research is conducted when there is a need to identify cause-and-effect relationships (Markus & Robey, 1988).

In this research, I have applied a case-study strategy with the exploratory research design with descriptive elements. Case study research can be beneficial for studying and understanding of complicated issues (Zainal, 2007). According to Yin (2017, p. 23) *'a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.'* A case study is recognised as a great tool to study issues regarding education (Gülseçen & Kubat, 2006), sociology and community-based problems (M. Johnson, 2006). Therefore, an object of the case study can be a variety of different things: an institution, an individual, a community, an activity or an event.

For this research, I have decided to choose the PB project in the City of Kyiv as a case. My ambition is to contribute to the theory and knowledge about PB, in general, using the empirical settings of Kyiv as there is an evolving PB practice.

Ukraine is an example of countries with the crisis of modern representative democracy, where the reinvention of democracy and creation of new democratic tools take place (Kvartiuk, 2016; Nodia et al., 2017). Ukraine is a developing country with a transitional economy, and it is the country with a Soviet past (Kvartiuk, 2015). Kyiv has been chosen, because it has an ongoing PB project as a new democratic tool started in 2016 (Miedviedkova & Rashdi, 2018). As it is still entirely a new tool for Kyiv and Ukraine in particular, it would be relevant to study the control dimension, as it is evolving from year to year. In Kyiv, the PB process seems to be administrative and managers driven. Some people created and managed the whole process, so it is a great chance to capture the control dimension. Furthermore, it seems that this case is in line with Aleksandrov and Timoshenko (2018) and Aleksandrov et al. (2018) and can provide additional knowledge and theory about PB. Moreover, as van Helden and Uddin (2016) admit, the research about recent developments in the public sector accounting and

budgeting in the developing countries is in short supply. The next paragraph describes the main actors in the PB process in Kyiv.

The PB process in Kyiv has begun in 2016 and has been evolving each year. Currently, there are several main actors involved in the PB process in Kyiv: citizens-participants, public managers (who work in local administration and local council) and members of NGOs (the primary function is the public control of PB process). During the implementation stage and throughout the next years there were as well consultants (often members of NGOs) who were helping with establishing the process and with maintaining the IT platform (websites, e-voting system). Public managers and members of NGOs are taking part in the PB process as the members of City/district working groups, PB commission and different departments in local administration. Deputies of the Kyiv City Council (KCC) adopt the Regulation on the PB for each year and make the amendments to the local budget. The PB process consists of the cooperation of all of the stated above actors. The whole process is explained in the empirical section. The more detailed analysis of these main actors is presented in Appendix B.

## 3.3 Data collection

As I have said before, I have chosen a qualitative research methodology for collecting data in this thesis. Qualitative data refers to pieces of information collected in the non-numeric form (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). The main qualitative techniques rely on language and its interpretation, so data collection methods involve the direct participation of people and tend to develop the theory rather than testing it (Walliman, 2006). In qualitative research, the researcher is the main instrument of data collection and is responsible for gathering the words or pictures, analysing them, focuses on the language of participants, and describes different processes (Creswell & Poth, 2017).

Qualitative methods consist of several types of data collection: direct observation, participation, interviewing, ethnography and written documents (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). Based on resource and time limitations, my study was

mainly based on interviews and documentary analysis. However, direct observations method has also been applied.

*Interviews*

Interviews are the major source of primary data in this research. Interviews are one of the most important sources of information for the case study method (Yin, 2017). Qualitative interviewing helps the researcher to reconstruct the events that he has never experienced, and by combining the descriptions from separate interviews, the researcher can create the view of different processes (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). Furthermore, in-depth interviewing aids in creating a portrait of the ongoing social process (Miller, 2007). The process of qualitative interviewing is based on conversation, whereas the researcher is asking questions and listening, and interviewees answer.

Interviews are different from day-to-day conversations since they are based on the number of questions about a particular purpose, usually having an in-depth exploration of the chosen topic (Charmaz, 2006). In this master thesis, semi-structured interviews are chosen. Semi-structured interviews are a list of questions asked in a flexible manner, where the role of the researcher is not to lead a informant towards an answer, but rather to provoke an informant to speak up on the chosen topic (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). Semi-structured interviews are more open due to the fact, that interview questions provide more critical and precise information regarding the topic because of the more personal replies. An open manner of the interview guide let the informant speak and express their perceptions and thoughts in the most attentive way possible (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015).

Taking into consideration the time limits and financial constraints, I have collected as much as I perceived enough divergent views. The idea of the data collection has been to cover the different perspectives of the control in PB, regarding the elements of dialogue. I have decided to focus on the main people involved in City working group (three informants), PB commission (two

informants), and as well I have interviewed citizens-participants who were creating the projects (see Appendix C). Six out of ten interviewees have had dual roles in the PB process during 2016-2019. Almost all of my interviewees have previously been citizens-participants before becoming the public managers or members of PB commission. I stopped conducting the interviews when I perceived that each new interview does not give me more valuable information.

Prior each of the interview I have sent an email to interviewees, or have told them by phone or face-to-face about who I am, what I am doing, what my study is about, why I want to talk with them, and what will be discussed with them. The example of the letter is presented in Appendix D. The interview guide (Appendix E) is used only internally. The questions in the interview guide were not strict questions that I would ask but more a guideline that I used. The informants knew that the interview would be about the topics I specified either in the letter or orally. However, they have not seen the questions, as the questions were prepared using the theoretical framework for internal usage by myself.

It was quite challenging for me as a master's student to prepare the right questions, especially regarding the enormous differences in languages. As interviews have been conducted using Ukrainian, the interview guide presented in Appendix E is slightly different from the one I used, because it is impossible to translate directly from English to Ukrainian and vice versa without losing the idea of a question. So, questions were translated with slight changes as the meaning of each of them regarding these two languages if translated directly, is biased. To sum up, the questions asked were not as concrete as they are presented in the interview guide. During the interview, I have presented the topics of the interview and have been asking the questions regarding those topics. If the question was not understandable, I have paraphrased it in order to make it more transparent for the informant.

During interviews, I have asked my informants to advise people that I can interview that would be relevant. Thus, I have used the 'snowball method' for

getting into contact with other related to PB in Kyiv people. 'Snowball method' is a method where the researcher is looking for the people with a high degree of knowledge on a studied topic, and then ask them to recommend other potential interviewees that would be relevant (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). One of the public managers has personally introduced me with the rest of the informants in administration. Moreover, I spent approximately an hour with him after the interview; he showed me how the website of the PB process in Kyiv is administrated, how the debates are being held.

I have recorded almost all of the interviews, except for one interview, where the informant has not allowed to do so. In this particular case, I have been writing the answers of the informant on the sheet of paper during the interview. Immediately after the interview, I have finalised her answers that I have not entirely written down and have sent her to get the approval whether I have understood her right. The rest of the interviews that have been recorded have been thoroughly transcribed and interpreted, and later on, sent to the interviewees if some parts of the interview have not been clearly understood. The main idea of that was not only to check my interpretations but to get new insights from the informants.

### *Observations and documentary analysis*

In addition to 10 interviews conducted, observations and documentary analysis techniques were used. Firstly, I have slightly used the direct observation method. I have attended two meetings where there was deliberation on some projects of citizens-participants and on how to create the project. Specifically, I have been observing the debates about the rejected projects for 20 minutes. Further, I have as well observed the deliberation held for the citizens-participants on how to create the projects for two hours. I was the complete observer of the process, which means that I maintained distance to the objects and contexts, avoiding interaction with them (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). I have taken notes

during the observation of these deliberations. It helped me to understand how the deliberations are held and what are the purposes and topics of them.

Secondly, I have used additional documentary sources. In general, secondary sources of data include written documents that have been produced by someone else, but that are relevant to a given research project (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). For the qualitative research, it is an advantage to analyse the background data about the context of the topic of the research. It is hardly a significant part of data collection, but it may help the researcher to better understand the phenomena and its context (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). Analysing this type of data helps me to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the PB process in Kyiv and is used to strengthen the validity and reliability of my research.

Among main types of the secondary data I have used are official government documents, laws, statistics provided by the website of the Kyiv City PB and reports made by NGOs about the PB process in Ukraine in general and in particular in Kyiv. It gave a general understanding of the PB process in Kyiv, its main participants, stages, the formation of the PB commission, implementation of projects, their types, etc. I have also used other written materials such as textbooks, newspaper articles, political speeches and earlier publications on the topic of PB in Kyiv.

## 3.4 Data analysis

After reading documents, observation notes and transcribed interview recordings, I have coded the information from all sources of data. The codes have been primarily taken from the theory and included elements of dialogue (Rajala & Laihonen, 2019) and LOC (Simons, 1995). The rest of the codes have been created by the researcher and included other interesting findings of PB in Kyiv in general. A deductive approach to analysis is that where codes are almost all predetermined and are taken from the literature; an inductive approach is that where there are no previously determine codes, and they are derived from the data

gathered from the informants (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015). Thus, the mixture of deductive and inductive coding methods has been applied, what is also referred as obduction approaching, i.e. moving back and force from theoretical ideas to empirical findings (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015).

The research work is based on a cross-case analysis. *'Cross-case analysis is a research method that facilitates the comparison of commonalities and difference in the events, activities, and processes that are the units of analyses in case studies.'* (Khan & VanWynsberghe, 2008, p. 2). The cross-case analysis may be performed using comparison and survey research (Yin, 2017). In comparison research, the data of each interview is analysed in full priory to make relevant comparisons. The responses of the interviewees have been analysed and compared on the cross-case basis to indicate similarities, differences and links in their perceptions of dialogue and control in PB.

## 3.5 Validity, reliability and ethical aspects

Validity and reliability can have different meanings depending on the philosophical position chosen. The researcher can use different tools for assessing the quality of research depending on the chosen epistemological approach. In this research, as it was mentioned before I have used social constructionism. Reliability is about *'whether there is transparency about data collection and interpretation?''* and validity concentrates on *"whether the study clearly gains access to the experience of those in the research setting?'* (Easterby-Smith et al., 2015, p. 306). The validity and reliability of the research largely depend on the methodological skills, integrity and sensitivity of the researcher, his ability to interview rather than just asking questions (Patton, 1990). The researcher must ensure a high level of validity and reliability by merely collecting relevant and high-quality data.

Reliability is about the possibility of replication of the research at a different time, either by another researcher or by the same researcher (Riley, Wood, Clark, Wilkie, & Szivas, 2000). To ensure the reliability of the study I have conducted

several interviews with different relevant people connected with PB process in Kyiv, as well as read relevant secondary data, including laws, official documents of the City Council, official reports made by the local-level managers, and statistics provided by the official website of the Kyiv City PB.

The issues of internal and external validities are as well described. External validity questions the generalizability of the research (Yin, 2017). I strive for theoretical generalisation, not empirical (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), so the issue of external validity is not relevant. Internal validity questions the results of the research, whether they are derived correctly (Yin, 2017). Internal validity concerns the whole research process. In order to ensure internal validity of my research, I have used both primary and secondary sources of data, and I have based my work on the previous literature and used proper theory to answer my research question.

As for the ethical aspect, I can assure that the research process is done truthfully without violating any ethical standards or applicable Code of Conduct. From the very beginning of the correspondence with interviewees, I have told them about myself, my research, have gotten their permission for conducting the interview and for audio recording. Moreover, I have gotten their permission on the usage of their names in my research. During the interview, every informant was able to stop answering at any point in time he or she felt unconfident or inconvenient. Besides, the interviewees were able to comment on the transcribed interviews.

However, one of the interviewees, who were citizen-participant, refuses to meet with me, has not allowed me to record the interview and to use her name in the research. During the interview, she told me her view on the conflict of interest of one of the deputies of City council as well as the unethical behaviour of this deputy and couple of public managers, and violations within the voting stage of PB. She said that she had no factual evidence about such violations, only her thoughts that is why she does not want me to include her name in this research.

As her contacts were given to me by another informant, I have to anonymise all of the informants.

During a couple of interviews, when I stopped recording, the informants started telling me more about the issues we discussed. After that, I have written their words down, send to them and ask if I can use them in my work. I received positive answers from all the people I asked. Some of the informants told me interesting things about some deputies, conflicts of interests and some other citizens-participants who have on their opinion violated some rules. It should be noted that other interviewees partially told me the same information, but before the point when I stopped recording.

## 4. Empirical part

In this section, I am presenting the empirical data that I have collected. At first, the background information about the case of Kyiv, which I have taken from secondary sources of data and interviews, is presented. It includes the general description of the PB process from 2016 till 2019, as well as the role of the main actors involved in this process. Then I provide the information that I have gotten from the interviews about the elements of dialogue and LOC applied to each of them.

### 4.1 Empirical background

According to the website of the Kyiv City participatory budgeting, the idea of introduction of PB began spreading in early 2016. USAID (NGO) have started promoting the idea of implementation of PB in Kyiv. They received a grant from the US government and developed their model of PB for Kyiv based on the Polish experience. Mayor of the city liked the idea, and Kyiv City State Administration (KCSA) issued a Regulation on implementing the PB based on the model developed by USAID on 15th of September 2016. The total amount of funds that have been allocated for PB in 2016 is equal to 50 million UAH or 0,01% of the 2017 budget.

However, Centre for Innovations Development and several other NGOs argued that this model had been developed without any deliberations with citizens and other NGOs. The local authorities agreed to organise several deliberations with the public and to make amendments into the Regulation. Lots of different actors have been involved in these deliberations including citizens, members of NGOs, public managers of KCSA, some deputies of KCC and IT specialists. In practice, as Head of Centre for Innovations Development said, *'we were able to change the model of the Kyiv PB dramatically. In the beginning, everything had to be controlled by officials and deputies. And we, through public discussions, which I moderated, in 3 months (till the end of 2016) have worked out a radically different Regulation approved by KCC without a single vote against it. We helped*

*to develop this model on the voluntary basis […] all the things we are doing for PB in Kyiv are voluntary.'*

Several other NGOs have been involved in the process of creating and implementing of PB model in 2016. Kyiv Smart City NGO has organised the whole process of deliberations on PB implementation voluntarily. The other significant NGOs that have been helping on the implementation stage are Reanimation Package of Reforms who have been consulting the local authorities and SocialBoost (NGO) who have created an online platform, where people could have submitted their projects and citizens could have voted for them. At a time when the research has been conducted the amount of money spent on PB has increased to 150 million UAH (0,26% of the budget), and the PB process included five stages outlined in Figure 2.

| February | • The beginning of public deliberation on PB<br>• Bringing new thoughts and experience to the PB<br>• Formation of the PB commission and working groups | Appointment of City/District working groups; election of PB commission |
|---|---|---|
| March - April | • Creation and submission of citizens' projects<br>• Collecting of other citizens voices<br>• Public deliberation on accepted projects | Citizens create teams and submit projects to District working groups |
| May - August | • The expertise of the projects<br>• Refinement of projects<br>• Debates between managers and citizens on rejected projects<br>• Promotion of the projects | Teams of citizens, PB commission and public managers |
| September | • E-voting on the projects<br>• Defining the winning projects | Citizens, City working group, PB commission |
| Following year | • Realization of projects | Citizens, public managers in KCSA and communal enterprises |

**Figure 2**. PB process in Kyiv

The PB process begins on February from the public deliberations on PB process in general, where local authorities (mainly City working group) talk with citizens and explain the essential requirements and get the feedback from citizens

in order to change Regulation on PB if needed. During this stage, City and District working groups are appointed by City administration and District administrations respectively, whereas PB commission is elected by citizens on the e-voting process. District working groups are responsible for checking the projects of people, if they meet the formal criteria (laws, regulations), as well as consulting of the citizens and helping them to correct the technical or jurisdictional problems; they also organize the deliberations on the submitted projects between the working groups, members of the teams that submitted the projects and other citizens. City working group is responsible for organising, shaping and moderation of the whole PB process on each stage, as well as for coordination and control of district working groups. It develops the PB process for the following year and organises the public deliberations on city-level projects and other issues if needed. PB commission is responsible for the control of the whole PB process whether it is implemented right, ensuring the ethical aspects of the process, resolving disputes between citizens and public managers, and it has a right to disqualify the projects the authors of which have used some fraud during the voting process or other stages of the PB. One of the central powers of the PB commission is that it can get back to voting the projects that have been rejected by the working groups or public managers in the departments of City administration.

From March till April, citizens unite in teams in order to create projects and submit them to the working groups (1138 projects submitted in 2018). After the submission of projects, District working groups verify the adherence of them to the different laws and regulations and can accept or reject projects for further completion. If the project is rejected, teams have time to make amendments and resubmit it. After making amendments, projects are verified again. All the accepted projects must collect voices of people using the e-voting tools (940 projects were accepted in 2018). If they collect enough voices, their project is accepted for public deliberation between the working groups, members of the

teams that submitted the project and other citizens. Then further verification of financial aspects is made by public managers of departments of city administration or communal enterprises.

This expertise and verification of projects, as well as public deliberation on them, are made from May till August. If the project is accepted by the public managers, they will check if the financial criteria are met (whether it is possible to realise the project with the financial plan developed for the project). In case if public managers reject the projects, the PB commission will organise debates between those managers and citizens. After that, members of the PB commission who are elected by the citizens using e-voting mechanisms and are members of NGOs, vote whether to accept or reject the project. If they accept the project, it will proceed to the voting process. During the public deliberations on this stage, citizens talk about their projects and try to convince others why their project is worth to be voted for and implemented. If the projects of different teams are quite similar, they will usually combine their separate projects into one.

After all verifications and deliberations, the e-voting process begins and lasts the whole of September. Members of the teams are collecting voices of citizens using personal communication with people they know, using social media, famous people, politicians (since 2018 deputies must declare the connection with the projects) or simply by communicating with people who might be interesting in implementing of their projects. Since one citizen of the City can vote for five projects, teams from one district usually create a pool of five projects and promote those five projects in order to ease the process of collecting of voices. PB commission is responsible for detecting any violation regarding the voting process, including bribery. PB commission can disqualify the teams that violated any rules regarding illegal voting. At the end of September, teams who collect sufficient voices are declared winners by the City working group (342 projects won in 2018). The last stage is the realisation of these projects, which lasts the whole following budgeting year. It involves the sincere cooperation between

members of the winning teams and public managers of departments in the city administration of communal enterprises. The winners are responsible for the control of the realisation of projects.

Thus, based on the presented above PB process, I have contacted the main actors involved in order to get different perspectives and to collect perceptions of different actors on dialogue and control in PB. Their understanding of dialogue elements of PB and how the LOC are implicated into these elements.

## 4.2 PB in Kyiv as a dialogue from different perspectives

As I have mentioned, the perceptions of people on the elements of dialogue and control dimension in PB, have been collected. The general understanding of these two dimensions varies from one actor to another. All the informants said that in one or another way, the dialogue is present in the process. As one of the members of the City working group said '*This is a completely transparent process, there is a special Facebook page that has over 10,000 people. If anyone has any questions, everything is publicly discussed. There are regular meetings at the level of teams of projects and managers of budget funds, districts, departments, public managers.*' Moreover, it is not only about the communication between citizens and local authorities but about communication among citizens. As one of the citizens-participant said '*...people have not communicated very much (before), and I see that now for some projects, neighbours start to speak with each other and cooperate...*' However, after analysis of all responses, I can conclude that the informants understand dialogue as a communication tool, cooperation between people. They talk more about specific outcomes, rather than a reflection of dialogue processes inside PB. It will be further elaborated in the next paragraphs.

Regarding the control dimension, different actors have a bit controversial view on that. Among people who represent the City working group or PB commission, everyone said that there are no barriers or frames of dialogue except the current legislation limitations. However, there are some limitations on the

voting process, since it is organised online. Amount of citizens who can vote limits to the number of people who have bank id or electronic signature. Those who do not have one of them, can not authorise on the website and vote. The control dimension is discussed more comprehensively regarding the elements of dialogue in the next paragraphs.

### 4.2.1 Purpose of the dialogue in PB

As one of the members of City working group who was in 2016 one of the central figures in organising the deliberations on the developing of Regulation on PB said *'There have been plenty of actors involved in the deliberations, including public activists, citizens, NGOs, deputies, public managers and other interested people. And they all had their purposes, and we had to take them all (purposes) into account […] The key principle implemented in the Regulation was trust. We developed this modern technology of participation (PB) in order to increase trust between citizens and local authorities.'* He as well mentioned that other initial purposes were the following, but not limited: to create the new democratic tool for participation of active citizens in the local government activities; to increase the power of citizens in the decision-making process; to increase the level of communication between citizens and local authorities; and others. This increase in communication may be seen from the increase in participation. There were 50 thousand people who either participated or voted in 2016, but in 2018 there were more than 150 thousand people who either participated or voted.

Almost all the interviewees have their perception of the purpose of the dialogue. However, some similar patterns for each group of actors, including public managers, members of PB commission (who are members of NGOs) and citizens may be distinguished. From the local authorities' perspective as a public manager and member of the City working group said: *'The main purpose is to make Kyiv better'.* The other views on the purpose of both citizens and authorities include the improving of dialogue between citizens and local authorities; changing the minds of people and involving people in budget formation.

However, the public managers and members of the PB commission have identified that PB is used by local authorities to resolve a lot of specific issues that they could not have done. One of the public managers and member of City working group said that '*Formally, the goal is to identify problems that have not been planned to be implemented by the authorities and which they may not have noticed [...] and realise it all at the expense of budgetary funds.*' Moreover, one of the members of PB commission gives even more comprehensive view on how local authorities see the usage of PB: '*The purpose of it is to solve the problem and begin to look at other different problems. The first is unequal funding. [...] The second problem is the fact that the residents, the authors who participate in the PB understand what is going on in the city better than the city administration. [...] The third moment, people are beginning to participate. Fourth, the social problem is solved...*' The local authorities are using PB in order to either resolve the problems that they could not resolve effectively before due to lack of information about the problems of the specific district; or to increase the standards of living comparing to the previous years.

From the perspective of citizens, the purpose of dialogue in PB varies significantly. As one of the citizen-participants said '*...it is (purpose) self-realisation, it is a desire to change for the better the environment where they live or work [...]. I know that many (participants) plan after a successful project in the PB to become a deputy, to go into politics.*' As he mentioned, there are already more than ten people who got the job either in KCSA or KCC after participation in PB. Interesting perspective has been presented by another citizen-participant who said that '*the purpose is to create some new innovative projects that improve the lives of citizens.*' Other citizens' view on the purpose of dialogue in PB is quite similar to the presented above views.

During my observations of public deliberation, I have seen that citizens are asking questions about how to win in the competition. There are interested in the creation of a good team, the efficient methods of collecting voices, the methods

of calculating of the budgets of the projects. They do not talk or ask about dialogue; they concentrate on the competition.

Thus, the conducted interviews and observations show that in some way the goal of PB for some actors was not about democratic means as such, but more about personal interests, competition, winning and participating in a game, or for public managers, for example, to increase legitimacy in some way since they search for communication channel. At the same time control here is unclear, almost no control is applied. I have not found any evidence either during the interviews or from the documents that the purpose of dialogue is somehow controlled. It is not that good that people have different interpretations on the purpose of PB; they forget that initially, it was about democracy. One of the reasons might be quite lousy communication between administration and citizens about the purpose.

### 4.2.2 Topic of the dialogue in PB

Talking about topics of the projects, they are distinguished by nature, size and budget. There are only formal frames on the nature of the chosen topic '…*of projects that can be submitted: education, culture, sports, housing and communal services, ecology, etc. Very sparse list of categories.'* (Member of City working group). However, all the informants said that these limits are not limits at all and you can submit any project that you want. One of the citizens-participants added that '*You can submit a project in a certain direction but describe it so that it can be fit to any category.'* There were no projects that were declined just because of the chosen topic. The control dimension may be seen here from the perspective of the boundary systems. Local authorities frame the topics; however, it is not perceived as a limitation from both public managers and citizens.

Size and budget of the projects are limited. There are two types of projects – city-wide projects and district projects. They are as well distinguished by the budget. Small projects begin from 50 thousand UAH, and the large projects are up to 3 million UAH. The whole sum allocated for PB in 2019 is 160 million

UAH. One of the members of PB commission explained this split as that '*For new teams, it is hard to take a big project, and it is not interesting to take small projects for strong teams, they already have 2-3 million to take.' It is important for us to involve as many active people who want to change the city of Kyiv as possible.*' If you submit the project with a higher budget, you will have to get more votes in order to win. This system has been introduced in order to give a chance to new and weaker teams to win. These frames are considered as boundary systems of control, where the local authorities put the limits on the size of the projects. However, as one of the members of the City working group said '*Every year the budget of the projects that have won does not fit exactly into the amount allocated for PB. So, the KCC raise the sum of money in order to finance all winning projects.*' It is seen as an interactive control, where the managers intervene in the process in order to raise the previously established boundaries.

The projects are framed as well by the previously existed legislation. '*In Kyiv, there are many objects, organisations, enterprises belonging to the state, and according to the Budget Code of Ukraine (BCU), state institutions can only be financed from the state budget. We can not, therefore, realise many projects.*' (Public manager, citizen-participant). However, it is not forbidden to realise projects on the state land or organisation, it is just said in the BCU that local budget funds should be spent only on the communal property and state budget funds should be spent on the state needs and property, As one of the citizens-participants said '*...they (public managers, departments) begin to think how to circumvent this norm so that some projects could be carried out on state property, but only if these projects would be accessible for every citizen of Kyiv.*' So, interactive control may be seen, where managers try to break some limitations to realise specific projects.

There are some deliberations on putting frames on the topics, and some actors want to put some quotas for specific categories. For example, for projects of people with disabilities, military personnel and so on but no frames or quotas

except the size of the projects have never been applied, and there are no plans to do so at least the next year. However, as one of the members of the PB commission said *'...education projects are among the most popular, without putting any frames. I am against any quotas, and I do not think that we will have some.'* Based on the website of Kyiv City PB, educational projects in 2016 have collected 25% of citizens votes, whereas in 2018 the number rose to 40%. Other topics collect no more than 20%, while the majority collects from 1% to 10%. So, there is a sort of domination of one topic area over others. Then it means that dialogue topics are quite limited. It seems that there is some kind of beliefs system of control that some topics are taken for granted. Since each year number of projects regarding education are rising and the majority of people vote for them, it is quite challenging to bring new topics into the process.

The other issue that concerns the topics of the projects is that there is a lack of deliberation on the accepted projects. *'We usually have a deliberation on the rejected projects. The department of KCSA or the district administration have some questions, and there is already a discussion about what is wrong with the project. As for me, it would be much better if during the year we discuss more specifically the problems of the city that need to be addressed and solved. Not only by PB projects, but just the local authorities to solve them.'* (Member of PB commission). However, one of the members of City working group said that the number of deliberations is increasing among the departments, for example, *'The finance department that was one of the closed departments now introduces a new budget regulation, which involves the inclusion of public consultations at all stages of budget preparation.'*

A couple of citizens who are the authors of the projects said that some framing of the topics should be introduced. *'In my opinion, the PB should have been organised as an initiative to introduce innovative projects, to develop IT-infrastructure of the city. Unfortunately, we see that PB became an instrument for changing the schools to a normal state.'* (Member of PB commission, citizen-

participant). The majority of the projects are about repairing something (schools, hospitals, parks) and as one of the citizens-participants mentioned *'...it should be done at the expense of budget funds by the administration without PB.'* He as well said that the idea of this innovativeness of PB projects *'has slightly deformed'*. It should be noted that both authors developed these non-innovative projects to repair schools in the previous year's even though they said that PB should not be used for that. This year they both will try to win with innovative projects, but this is about winning, about the game, but not the dialogue. In this situation, we can see that there is a lack of control of the topic since the innovative rhetoric of PB is *'slightly deformed'*.

Thus, the topic of the dialogue is controlled both by boundary and interactive systems. Boundary systems are seen in the formal legislation frames on the size, budget and categories of the topics of the projects. The interactive control is seen when the authorities are breaking those boundaries for some projects and accept them to the voting process. All topics are formed not using dialogue, deliberation and discussion, but under the influence of the competition or game in which everybody wants to win, so the strengthening of domination of one specific topic is observed. It means that participants and organisers are mixing dialogue with other things, actually replacing dialogue with gaming. Furthermore, the was no control of the innovativeness of the projects, which has led to its vanishing. Moreover, there is no deliberation on the topics of the projects that have won. So, it seems that there is a monologue, rather than dialogue since the topics are created by the authorities and by means of competition, even though there is a deliberation on some specific projects, where the frames of the topics may be overwhelmed.

### 4.2.3 Participants of the dialogue in PB

The main actors in Kyiv are City/district working groups, PB commission (NGO members), public managers in departments of KCSA or in communal enterprises who realise the projects, and of course citizens who participate. As one

of the members of City working group said: *'First and foremost, the main two parties are always present - people who want to change something, and officials who can allocate funds, or influence otherwise, to solve the problem.'* One of the citizens-participants said that the main actors are *'…the authors of the projects.'* *'Even foreigners can submit a project.'* (Member of PB commission). The other participants that take part in the PB process are communities, activists, deputies, students and even children older than 14 years old.

All the informants told me that there are no barriers at all to attend the meetings and deliberation either offline or online. *'There are no barriers for taking part in the discussions. We make mailings; we are open, public, have a Facebook, there is a site, you can write to everyone in the messenger. All working groups consist of representatives from the public and the authorities. Together we all discuss […]. Although it sometimes happens that the public is disrespectful with the authorities.'* (Member of City working group). So, there are no limits to join the conversation; citizens can even ask to join the projects of other citizens online.

Nevertheless, there are some limits for participation not in deliberation, but the voting process for some categories of people. Specifically, there are some barriers for senior people as voting is done only online. *'It is tough for pensioners; it relates to the voting system. We have a voting system through the bank ID, that is, anyone who knows what a smartphone is and can use it, it is easy for them. […] Those people who are not good at the computer have a problem to vote. It is a frame, but it is more about security.'* (Member of PB commission). Moreover, some senior people do not trust the e-voting process. However, a couple of informants told me that they have helped senior people to vote, explaining and showing them how to do that. This e-voting system is applied in order to exclude the possibility of fraud during the voting stage. From the perspective of some categories of citizens (mostly pensioners), it may be a boundary system of control, where they are kind of kicked off from the voting process.

Talking about the participation of people in general in PB dialogue, there is a lack of participation of senior people (1-6% of the projects in 2016-2019) and young people under 25 years old (8-12% of the projects in 2016-2019). One of the members of the PB commission explained to me that pensioners usually do not participate *'because they have a completely different mentality. They think why they should submit the projects if they pay taxes and the state itself should do it [...] a lot of older people believe that it is another way to steal budget funds.'* The other issue that bothers a couple of interviewees is to allow children older than 14 to vote for PB projects. As one of the citizens-participants said *'they (children older than 14) are already receiving an ID, the legislation obliges them to get an ID, they are essentially adult children, well, really adults.'*

Two informants told me that the only actor that PB dialogue lack is media. As one of the members of the City working group said: *'the attention of the media to this process is insufficient.'* Another member of the City working group added that *'...the media are so politically engaged, they are so interested in scandals, quarrels, etc., that, where there is a positive process, they, unfortunately, are uninterested. It is such an interesting observation.* Thus, all actors try in some ways to promote PB using their means of communication.

However, there is an issue with citizens-participants who win each year. There are people and even teams, that are called 'professional teams' (as one of the members of City working group called them) who have won in 2016, 2017 and 2018 or at least two of the years. It means that it is a stable practice, and there is an element of domination of particular groups of actors. These actors usually have strong teams that accumulated experience and knowledge and are marginalising other actors.

The other issue is that there are thousands of people involved in the process, and it creates additional complexity on the dialogue between those participants. City administration is physically not able to communicate equally with thousands of people who submitted projects (2136 projects submitted in 2019). As one of

the members of the City working group said *'public managers spend an enormous amount of time on the checking of the projects and communication with citizens under PB. They even usually do not have enough time to do their primary duties because of PB'*. So, the question arises how to control more than two thousand projects and communicate with all participants? Consequently, it is not surprising that there is an issue of such professional teams who win each year since participants of the dialogue are not controlled.

Thus, it seems that those who are older than 14 and who are willing to participate do so. There are no limits on participation, even foreigners can submit the projects, but they can not vote. However, for some citizens, mainly senior, it is usually quite challenging to vote, since the voting process is done online. It is seen as a sort of boundary system of control when they are kind of kicked off from the process. It should be noted that this issue is reducing each year. Another issue revealed is about the formation and existence of 'professional teams' who win each year and marginalise other participants. Moreover, there are thousands of people that take part in the PB process and City administration is physically not able to communicate equally with thousands of people and to control the process.

### 4.2.4 Time span of the dialogue in PB

The dialogue in PB is present during the whole budgeting year, that is one calendar year and begin on 1st of January (which was not the case in 2016, when PB was just introduced in autumn). At the end of the Empirical background section, I have presented the actual dates of all stages. The PB process begins with deliberation about how PB should be organised this year, then people create their projects internally (usually take up to two months) and submit them to the working groups. If the project is rejected, the deliberation under the control of PB commission between authors and the responsible department or communal enterprise who are responsible for the topic of the projects begin. The teams have up to two months to make amendments to the projects in order to get them accepted for the voting process. During the voting stage, which lasts one month,

the authors should promote their projects and speak with many people in order to convince them to vote for their projects. Some of the informants told me that it is quite hard to collect the voices of people. If the project wins, the dialogue between the managers of departments or communal enterprises who are responsible for the managing of the budget funds and authors of the winning projects begins. They cooperate during the actual implementing of the projects.

The existence of such time frames for each stage of the PB process is seen as a boundary system of control. Even though all stages have the time frames, a member of NGO responsible for implementing of PB in Kyiv said *'each year they (local authorities) extend the period for submitting of projects and for making changes in them.'* There are problems with the implementing of some specific projects as well. There are still projects that have won in 2016 but have not been realised yet. It should be noted that in 2016 there was quite symbolic verification of projects, because of lack of experience and the absence of a structured procedure. Usually, projects were not realised due to legal issues so that local authority has no right to implement them; or due to the wrong estimation of the budget. However, a member of the City working group said *'PB is obligatory for execution if people voted and the project won in the ranking, turned out to be passable, then local authorities will implement it. […] And the authorities, if they legally can do that, they implement it the next year, or after two years.'* It is viewed as the interactive control system when public managers are changing the time frames in order to sustain dialogue and realise projects.

The other issues connected with time is shifting of the time frames. One of the citizens-participants said that *'the time (for preparing the project) is quite enough. This year (2019), because the time frames were slightly shifted to the beginning of the year, many (authors) were not ready for that, they thought that they should prepare them either at the beginning of the summer or at the end of the spring.'* Another citizen-participant also added that *'time frames are constantly changing, unfortunately, in Kyiv. The situation is changing; budget*

*timing has now changed this year. And we only had two weeks to inform people about the need to submit projects already. Everyone thought that it would be necessary to do that later; this is a considerable disadvantage. However, they promise that from next year we will have the same time frames.'* These changes in time frames have been done in order to be in line with the BCU.

The actors that really lack time are members of District working groups and public managers. As it was discussed above, the number of projects has risen from 492 in 2016 to 2136 in 2019. Members of district working groups have just two working days since the submission of projects to check whether they are not violating any laws or regulations. Public managers must check the budgets of the projects, whether they are calculated right. It takes an enormous amount of time and the issue of how to effectively control all of them arise. As one of the members of the City working group told me *'Some of the managers they do not want to realise some of the projects because it would take much time. So, they try to reject such projects…'* The other issue relates to the lack of time for new participants. As another member of the City working group said *'New members, they always lack time. No matter how much you give to them. Each year we extend time frames for some teams, but they always lack time. It is not the case for those who participated earlier.'* The time frames are usually expanded for those whose projects were rejected, and they lack time in order to make amendments and resubmit their project.

Thus, the time frames of each of the stages of the PB process are defined and limited by the authorities. The existence of such time frames indicates that the boundary system of control is applied. However, time frames are sometimes expanded by the authorities in order to give some teams more time for making amendments into the projects and resubmit them, which means that the interactive system of control is applied. Not only citizens lack time; public managers must verify an enormous number of projects (2136 in 2019) and communicate equally

with thousands of citizens, which is practically almost impossible within such time frames.

### 4.2.5 Forum of the dialogue in PB

There are a lot of different places where deliberations either on the creating of projects or on resolving different issues take place. It should be noted that all the interviewees told me that there is always a forum for deliberation provided by the KCSA. As one of the members of the City working group said *'we do many workshops, now we have a PB school in the Children's Palace. We reserve halls permanently in the KCSA. All meetings of the PB commission and public discussions are held online; all videos are on the YouTube channel of the KCC.'* There are other places where the meetings are held, for example, as another member of City working group said *'the main discussions are held in the KCSA and in district administrations, as well as in various forums, organisations, Kyiv smart city, Urban Space 500, CPPCI. That is, the locations are very different, including even the places of NGOs, hubs.'* Other places include libraries, universities and schools.

The meetings are initiated not only by the local authorities who provide the space but can be organised by citizens who may apply for a place in the KCSA. As one of the citizens-participants said *'I do not see the problem of organising one or the other event, because you can always ask officials, public activists, and people who have previously participated in the PB and they will help with a place. Often, the development of projects is done by the authors themselves, but it is possible to come and get advice.'* It means that there are no direct limits of the forum of the deliberation. However, some sort of interactive control may be visible as people have to apply for the room in the KCSA and there is a possibility that they will be rejected because on that specific time the room will be busy. Nevertheless, nobody has told me that the public managers of KCSA have ever rejected to give a space for deliberation, and in case if space is busy citizens

always can hold a meeting in the common rooms in the KCSA or go to the district administrations, or other communal properties.

The places where the projects are created by the citizens as well vary significantly. As one of the citizens-participants told me *'Projects are created anywhere, even in the park. You came to the park saw that at night you are scared. And you think "oh, come on; I will make the lights in this park...". The idea can be born anywhere. You come home and start creating the project.'* Another citizen-participant said that when their team created their first project, they *'started with the cafe, going where we were allowed to order nothing and sit and discuss, but we disturbed people who came to drink coffee. And we have found such a format when you can ask for a room in a library or school, and they are always ready to help.'* A couple of informants told me that schools, libraries, communal enterprises and universities gave them a space to create projects for free. One of the citizens-participants explained it the following way: *'we implemented the project for the library, and now this library is a hub. And we have partner relations with it. We only call, and we say that we will discuss the new project tomorrow, and they say: "please come."* So, the dialogue between the communal enterprises and the citizens have strengthened, and trust and cooperation between them have increased.

This year the City working group has decided to organise additional meetings and to open the school of PB, which is held in the Kyiv Palace of Children and Youth. As one of the members of the City working group said *'This year, we have open lectures every week. there are many lectures on the advancement of projects, on drafting projects, on solving those or other problems.'* I have attended one of these lectures and saw what is going on there. Basically, citizens who are creating new projects may attend these meetings if they want and receive quite valuable tips on how to create the projects without mistakes, how to calculate the budget of the project, how to engage other people to your team, how to cooperate with others, how to collect voices and promote

your project and so on. This school as a place may be seen as some interactive control from the authorities, a couple of interviewees told me that they are interested in the spread of the PB, so they want new teams to have more chances to win. As they said, there are now quite a lot of teams who win almost every year, and it is harder to win for new teams. That is why they are trying to teach new people on creating the projects.

Thus, the meetings are held in a variety of places. It can be KCSA, school, library, university, District administration, park, café, communal enterprise, public hall, and others. Local authorities provide the place where citizens can hold public deliberations on projects, and there is no visible control of it. Also, citizens can choose the place where they want to create their projects, and it can be any place, they perceive appropriate for them and other people.

### 4.2.6 Method of the dialogue in PB

In the model presented in the Literature review section, such element as a method of the dialogue is defined in the way that everybody should have the possibility to speak and be treated equally. However, in reality, it is not always like that, and it largely depends on the actors who take part in the deliberations, but usually, everybody has an opportunity to speak. As one of the members of the City working group said *'Events are announced in advance. All people have the opportunity to speak. Everything is open; we are interested in getting as many people as possible.'* In case of online communication, it is quite hard to limit the dialogue and as one of the citizens-participants said *'a lot of the PB community is on Facebook, and Facebook is very difficult to limit, so thoughts of people are available, for those who want to hear and to be heard.'* However, online communication is sometimes limited, especially regarding the PB process in 2018. There is a rule that if the posts or comments on Facebook's PB in Kyiv page contain bad words or advertise something, they should be deleted. However, one of the citizens-participants said that *'some posts, even without any violations, as far as I know, have been removed from this group. Not quite, if you say,*

*democratic.'* It is, in fact, a great example of interactive control, where the administration deletes the posts that they perceive not convenient for them.

There are deliberations within teams who develop the projects; between citizens and city administration; and between authors of the projects and the people who vote for the projects. As one of the citizens-participants said *'PB is every single project, and very much depends on the author and the team. If this is an open team with an author who wants to create a good project, then he always listens to the others. If the project is used for his (author) purposes, ambitions or political issues, then usually nobody is heard.'* There are many cases outlined by at least half of the informants, where some people think that the only right way to do that is their way and they do not hear the others. Another citizen-participant said that voices of people are heard *', but it is possible that our society may not perceive this or that opinion. In the PB process, according to the results of last year's discussions, there were sharp statements, conflicts and misunderstandings of a particular process, or projects.'*

Talking about the type of deliberation, whether it should be an open debate or somebody should moderate the discussion, the answers are different. Some people say that there is an open debate, and almost no moderation is exercised. *'The open debate exists, since public budgets have created open groups in social networks, there is a large page on Facebook, where everyone can express their thoughts.'* (Citizen-participant). The others as well say that there is an open debate, however with slightly or much higher moderation, because as they perceive the process needs to be controlled in some way. As one of the members of City working group said *'Of course, the process needs to be moderated, because otherwise, it can turn into a stream of consciousness, that is completely illogical and waste the time of people. [...] Everyone comes for the sake of a particular case, so it must necessarily be moderated.'* However, he admits that the authorities must learn how to moderate it in the right way.

Almost all participants said that moderation is not limiting the dialogue. *'On the contrary, everyone will be grateful.'* (Citizen-participant). Whether the discussion can be limited largely depends on the person who moderates. *'If the (public) manager has no evil intent, he can not limit us. Yes, indeed, even in free discussions that are held without moderation, we can invite a few people who will start taking the initiative and the discussion will turn into chaos, and nobody will be able to speak. Therefore, such risks exist in any form of discussion, either completely open or completely moderated.'* (Citizen-participant).

Unfortunately, there are plenty of cases, where there should be some control, as in that particular cases the dialogue quite paradoxically is limited. As one of the members of the PB commission said *'This should be an open debate, but there must be some sort of moderation, but within reasonable frames. Many people come in with political projects, and certainly, there should be moderation, in order to have no PR or political context.'* Moderation is also needed in order *'not to give someone a voice, but on the contrary, everyone was able to speak without the pressure of other people.'* (Member of PB commission). Several interviewees told me that the deliberation within a team of a particular project is moderated by the leader of the project. This moderation is viewed as an interactive control system, as public managers or leaders of teams more or less control the deliberation, either online or offline.

Politicians or other related parties lobby some projects. As one of the members of the PB commission said *'We are trying to cut off projects that are promoted by lobbyists. These lobbyists are taking money from the participants and promoting their projects.'* So, there is a situation, where the deputies should limit themselves from lobbying, which is not happening. *'A deputy in his district, whose team submits the project, wants to get some electoral points. Many deputies are doing this. We ask them to regulate this process by making them declare which projects they support, why they support them, what principles they use to support them, and so on.'* (Member of PB commission). It should be noted that some

deputies are declaring their relation to some projects. They declared their connection with more than a hundred projects in 2019 (134 out of 2136 projects).

There are some serial projects (same projects proposed for many schools) connected with particular schools that have won, but in that school, the administration did not know about that project. *'Someone else voted for this school. And they throw out one of the school's projects. […] It turns out that in the case of this project, the deputies did not declare their participation, but political agitation in schools is carried out, although this is prohibited by the decision of the KCC.'* (Member of City working group). Moreover, *'Their projects had negative examinations, but they were at that time members of the PB commission, filed a complaint and accepted back their projects. They declared a conflict of interest when they voted on the acceptation of these projects, but there were enough votes to allow all their projects last year (2018) before the vote. They won 43 projects (out of 320 they submitted). They earned 20 thousand UAH per winning project.'* (Member of City working group). Their interest is to make money, and it has nothing to do with dialogue, it is an entirely monologic situation. This team has not heard the others; they cover their material needs using the conflict of interests under the democratic agenda of their project and PB in general. The case of these projects is a great example of the situation where the lack of control limited the dialogue.

There are lots of conflicts in the PB process. As one of the members of the City working group said *'There is much negativity. People cheat on Facebook, move on to the personality, create their groups on Facebook, start to discuss there, pour dirt on others, hold some press conferences, blame others.'* However, several actors try to resolve these conflicts. When the project is rejected by the District working group or by related Department or by the communal enterprise, the PB commission can 'save' such project, if the majority of its members vote for that. As one of the members of the PB commission said *'We invite both sides*

*and try to resolve conflicts through dialogue. […] we listen to both sides and make a decision.'* So, the conflicts are resolved by the usage of interactive control.

At the end of the interview, each informant has been asked if he or she had a feeling that the whole PB process had been framed and somebody had led them. The answers are different, from 'the process was not framed at all' to 'the process is moderately framed'. One of the members of PB commission who thinks that the process is not framed said that *'if you understand a little about all the processes, you understand how everything should be, then it is complicated for an official to regulate you.'* Moreover, he as well said that *'As for those people who found votes, most of their projects were implemented, so it is hard to say that all participants have been framed.'*

One of the members of the City working group said that *'Of course, there are officials who try to manage this manually. […] such attempts exist, such attempts happen. The lobbyists are trying to prescribe a Regulation that would benefit them. So that projects lobbying for them could pass, and projects of their opponents could not pass.'* Another member of the City working group said that the frames and leading in PB process in Kyiv are present *'As well as in any technology, but how can it be otherwise? Yes, this is the technology that leads, but in which there is a purpose.'*

One of the citizens-participant outlined a very positive outcome of PB dialogue. He said: *'When the projects of people are realised, the budget funds are not laundered. For example, if public managers during their day to day duties are making public procurements, they will overstate the budget of procurements. There are examples when one litre of paint is bought for 250 UAH, whereas it can be bought in the supermarket for 70 UAH. However, when they are making procurements for PB projects, citizens control the whole process and paint is even bought for 40 UAH.'* It means that through the means of interactive control conducted by citizens whose projects have won, the budgetary funds are saved.

Thus, there is a possibility for everybody to speak, however it not always that everybody is heard either by other citizens or local authorities. There are cases when authorities delete some posts from the Facebook group, consequently limiting the dialogue using interactive control. Deliberations are held in the form of debates; however, they are moderated by authorities. Different actors think that the deliberations should be moderated and there is nothing wrong with it, but authorities must learn how to moderate them right. Unfortunately, such issues as political influence, lobbyism, conflict of interests and personal gain are present in the PB process in Kyiv, which indicates that there is a lack of control of them. Finally, it is revealed that PB has a quite positive outcome of saving budgetary funds.

## 5. Discussion

### 5.1 PB dialogue and control in the case of Kyiv

The research aims to study the role of control and its influence on the shaping of the dialogue in PB. It becomes essential precisely because, in the literature, there is a common acknowledgement that the dialogic means of PB should somehow be controlled. Furthermore, some researchers state that it would be interesting to study how much control is needed in order to sustain healthy and balanced dialogue between involved actors (Aleksandrov et al., 2018) who are used to act in a monologic way (Brown & Dillard, 2015a, 2015b). My research question was *'What kind of control is exercised in the PB process and how it shapes PB dialogic means?'* In order to answer it, I mobilised dialogue literature, specifically the dialogic framework of Rajala and Laihonen (2019) and control literature from the perspective of Simons' LOC (Simons, 1995). The perceptions of people on all elements of dialogue are used in order to create the model of PB dialogue on the case of Kyiv and LOC that are used for shaping those elements.

As the literature says, PB, as a democratic tool, should be based on dialogue (Brown, 2009; Fung, 2015). My findings show that PB in Kyiv despite initial rhetoric for dialogue, innovativeness and trust building became a sort of platform in which citizens compete with each other in order to win. Despite that, there are positive outcomes observed such as an increase in trust between citizens and authorities, increase in the level of communication between citizens and authorities, increase in the power of citizens in the decision-making process (Cooper et al., 2006; Hadden & Lerner, 2011; Lerner, 2011). PB as well helps to save budgetary funds, which are spent much more efficiently during the realisation of projects rather than during the ordinary activities of the administration. At the same time, it creates lots of opportunities for cheating, lobbying, earning money and conflicts of interests. So, it differs from the model of dialogue in PB developed in the Literature review section. The new

characteristics of each element of dialogue as well as the control applied based on the case study of Kyiv are presented in Table 2.

**Table 2. Elements of the dialogue in PB in the case of Kyiv**

| Element of dialogue | Characteristic of PB based on the case of Kyiv | Control |
|---|---|---|
| The purpose of a dialogue | PB purpose is changing for different actors and depends on their interests. It can be improving dialogue and trust between citizens and local authorities; changing the minds of people; involving of people in budget formation; making the city better; resolving some issues that local authorities do not want to resolve; the personal aim of self-realisation, winning in the competition and seeking for employment. | No substantial control is exercised. There is a lack of control. |
| The topic of a dialogue | Formal topics are formed by local authorities, relate to education, healthcare, transport, etc., and are framed by the local authorities and previously existed legislation, which indicates monologic situation, rather than dialogic. Informal topics are created through the mechanisms of competition, where some citizens try to use specific categories of projects in order to win. | Quite a substantial boundary and interactive control systems, as well as beliefs systems, are present. There is a lack of control for sustaining innovativeness. |

| The participants of a dialogue | All people who are older than 14 years old and who are willing to participate are participating in PB dialogue. However, there are such issues as lack of participation of some categories of people (mostly senior people and media); some sort of domination of some team who wins each year which creates a monologic situation; an enormous pressure on the public managers who must verify an enormous amount of projects (2038 in 2019) . | No substantial control is exercised. There is a lack of control. From the perspective of a portion of senior people, there is a sort of boundary system as due to the lack of digital knowledge, some of them are not able to vote. |
|---|---|---|
| The time span of a dialogue | Dialogue is attached to budgeting timetable and is different on each stage of the PB. However, these stages can be expanded for some reasons. The other issue is that public managers do not have enough time to verify an enormous number of projects promptly and to communicate with all the citizens-participants equally. | The existence of such timeframes of different stages indicates that boundary systems of control are applied, the fact that time frames can be expanded indicates the presence of interactive systems of control. |

| The forum of a dialogue | Dialogue in PB is designed as face-to-face open meetings that can be as well watched online. The space for such a meeting is provided by local authorities, communal enterprises and by citizens themselves. | No substantial control is exercised. |
|---|---|---|
| The method of a dialogue | There is a possibility for everybody to speak. However, not everybody is heard by other citizens or sometimes by authorities, and it creates conflicts. In some teams, some leaders do not want to listen to anybody else, thus creating the monologic situation. Authorities moderate the meetings where there is a deliberation. Such issues as lobbying, conflict of interests, political interference and using PB for personal gain are as well present and create a monologic situation. | In some cases, there is an interactive control system applied, for example, when the deliberation is moderated. In other cases, no control as such is applied, which leads to monologue. |

It can be seen from the table that all elements are either slightly or significantly differ from the model presented in the Literature review and theory section. Regarding the control dimension, it is applied for some elements, but others experience a lack of it. Further discussion of elements is presented in the next paragraphs.

## 5.2 Purpose of the dialogue and lack of control

The initial purpose of the dialogue in PB in Kyiv was increasing trust and communication between citizens and authorities, promoting civic engagement, active participation, governance and new forms of democracies which is in line with lots of literature about PB (Célérier & Botey, 2015; Cooper et al., 2006;

Hadden & Lerner, 2011). However, some actors do not perceive all the stated above as the purpose of PB. The goal of PB for them was not about democratic means as such, but more about personal interests, competition, winning and participating in a game, or for public managers, for example, to increase legitimacy in some way since they search for the communication channel.

There are more than ten people who have got employment in the City administration, council, or in the working groups after the participation in PB. It goes in line with Célérier and Botey (2015) who had similar results regarding the previously marginalised people who raised their position and influence in public. As for some of the public managers, they use PB in order to solve the issues that they have not identified before, rather than thinking about trust, democracy or communication. It is the example of diagnostic control; however, it is not connected with the control of purpose, it is that purpose is to control the issues they need to solve and use citizens in order to find such issues.

Even though the primary purposes of PB are partially met as the trust and the level of communication between citizens and authorities have increased, citizens usually do not think that this is the aim of their participation. Everyone has its purpose, and in general, it is not about democracy, but about the participation or winning in some competition, where different participants have their aim. It means that there is a lack of control of the purpose of PB since some actors do not perceive that PB is about trust or democracy. The reason for that might be the lack of communication between citizens and authorities on the purpose of PB.

## 5.3 Topic of the dialogue and boundary, interactive and beliefs control as well as lack of it

Topics of the dialogue in PB in Kyiv are framed by local authorities and are connected with education, healthcare, transport, culture, ecology, IT, security, etc. which is in line with the literature on PB (Bartocci et al., 2019; Sintomer et al., 2008; Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016). Projects are framed regarding the size,

budget and specific categories by either previously existed legislation or specific regulations on PB. All these frames are a boundary system of control, where the authorities are somewhat limiting dialogue by introducing some frames. In a long-term perspective, it can lead to the banking approach (Brown, 2009) which means that people will be guided to a *'pre-identified right answer'*. However, these frames may be broken in cases of some specific projects. It is seen as an interactive system of control since local authorities are breaking the rules in order to implement precious projects that relate to the whole city, but legally cannot be realised because of previously existed legislation.

Informal topics are created by the citizens through the means of competition rather than deliberation. Lack of control on sustaining innovativeness in PB topics create a virtual circle – the same teams are winning each year. Every citizen who participates wants to win by promoting his or her project, developing the team and creating the pools with other groups in order to get more votes. Some of them tend to create and submit the projects connected with school or university, where it would be much easier to collect votes since there are lots of people that are interested in the realisation of such projects. It might not be wrong, but it is happening and is different from the model introduced in the literature review section.

The interactive control is seen as a positive tool since there are projects that do not depend on the local authorities. Some projects that relate to some hospitals or universities that are state-owned could not be financed through the means of PB since it is a violation of the BCU. However, thousands of people use them every day, so the interactive decision of local authorities on the acceptation of such projects to the voting process is rather positive than negative. Boundary systems, however, have a negative influence on dialogue. As it was mentioned in the Empirical part, one of the public managers told that there is a lack of deliberation on winning projects, which means that topics are not sufficiently discussed and are formed by the local authorities. They should be formed with the

usage of dialogue, rather than monologue, which is as well observed in the literature (Aleksandrov et al., 2018).

## 5.4 Participants of the dialogue and lack of control

All people, including citizens, public managers, consultants, members of NGOs, politicians who are willing to participate do so, which is in line with Célérier and Botey (2015). There are no limits on participation in deliberations, with just one exception that citizens must be older than 14 years old in order to have the ability to submit the projects and older than 18 years old to vote. There is no lack of willingness to participate in PB in general as the number of participants has tripled since 2016 (from 50 thousand to 150 thousand in 2018), which somewhat contradicts with the literature (Aleksandrov & Timoshenko, 2018; Rodgers, 2005; Uddin et al., 2017; Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016). However, there is a lack of participation of some categories of people, mainly senior people and media. Senior people are somewhat kicked off from the voting process since it is done online, and they usually cannot vote without help, but this problem has been reduced since 2016. From their perspective, it can be seen as a boundary system of control. However, the e-voting system has been introduced in order to exclude the risk of fraud during the counting of voices.

Some teams are called 'professional teams', and they have won each year or almost every year, which means that it is a stable practice. These teams who gained knowledge and experience are marginalising others, so there is a sort of domination. There is a lack of control on such teams, and it leads to the monologic situation where it is much harder to win for new participants. However, in the literature, the domination of some citizens have not been observed, but some papers indicate the domination of politicians (Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016) and NGOs (Aleksandrov et al., 2018) in the PB process.

The other issue is that there are thousands of people involved in the process, and it creates additional complexity on the dialogue between those participants. City administration is physically not able to communicate equally with thousands

of people who submitted projects (2136 projects submitted in 2019). It is a paradox of democracy; the intent is to make it as broad as possible so that everyone can participate, but how to work with it, how to control it? It creates many inconveniences for public managers, who do not have enough time to conduct their ordinary duties because of such a large number of projects. The issue of participants of the dialogue became an issue of not about people in PB, but about projects in PB, their quantity, and how many of them the authorities can handle. So, there is no control of participants, and it leads to the monologic situation because of the inability to communicate with everybody equally. However, if there would be some boundaries on participation in PB, would not it as well lead to the monologic situation?

## 5.5 Time span of dialogue and boundary and interactive control

Dialogue is attached to budgeting timetable (Aleksandrov et al., 2018) and is different on each stage of the PB. For each stage of the PB process, there are specific time frames. There is a lack of dialogue on the initial stage and for some teams on the voting stage. On other stages, dialogue in some ways is present. There is a lack of time for preparing the projects for some teams, especially new teams each year. It is in line with some democratic literature, which says that it is challenging in terms of timing to sustain dialogue (Brown & Dillard, 2015b). That is why the time frames are expanded for such teams so that they have more time to create the projects. However, such teams usually lack time no matter how much authorities would give them. The existence of time frames indicates that the boundary system of control is applied. However, there should be time frames, since, without them, it would be hard to organise the voting process and implement the projects. The fact that time frames are expanding each year for some teams indicates that the interactive systems of control are used. It may disadvantage other teams who had less time, but additional time is given mainly for those whose projects that have been rejected, and they have to make amendments in order to resubmit them.

The other issue which was outlined before is that public managers do not have enough time to verify such number of projects promptly. The time frames for them are quite strict, as they have the same amount of time or even less, than citizens who prepare no more than two projects. The authorities will have to verify more than two thousand projects in 2019. Again, quite paradoxically, there should be some sort of control on the number of projects, but if it would be applied, will it limit the dialogue?

## 5.6 Forum of the dialogue and absence of control

Dialogue in PB in Kyiv is designed as face-to-face open meetings which go in line with Baiocchi and Ganuza (2014). However, citizens can as well watch those meetings online. The places where all the deliberations take place are not controlled at all. Moreover, the space for such meetings is provided by local authorities, communal enterprises and by citizens themselves. It could be a park, school, City administration, library, communal enterprise, even conference hall. Citizens may apply for any space that can be provided by the local authorities or choose their place in order to make deliberations. There is no control exercised, and it seems that the dialogue is present.

## 5.7 Method of dialogue in PB and interactive control and lack of it

There is a possibility for everybody to speak. However, not everybody is heard by other citizens or sometimes by authorities. Administration couple of times deleted posts on the Facebook page on PB in Kyiv, when they disagreed with them. It might be an indicator that authorities do not like critics and are trying to avoid it using an interactive system of control. There are such teams where the leaders are not listening to the others since they perceive that only their thoughts are the right thoughts and will help them to win in the competition. It leads to the monologic situation that is as well observed in the literature (Aleksandrov et al., 2018; Harun et al., 2015). This situation should somehow be controlled, so the authorities have made amendments to the Regulation and allowed teams to change the leader through the voting process, which is seen as an interactive control.

The deliberations are conducted in the form of debates, but the process is moderated, which is an application of interactive control. As it was mentioned in the Empirical part, some actors agree that there should be some moderation and argue that without it there would be a full mess, where everybody would try to lead and do not listen to the others, creating the monologic situation. However, the wrong moderation of the deliberation may lead to the marginalisation of some participants and as well to the monologue. So, the question arises about how to moderate the deliberation in order to sustain dialogue, rather than monologue? One of the interviewees said that authorities must learn how to moderate the process in the right way.

Unfortunately, the issues of the political influence, lobbyism, conflict of interest and possibility of personal gain are present in the PB process in Kyiv. Several deputies are promoting some projects in order to gain positive feedback for the next elections, which is partially in line with Velinov and Kuruppu (2016) where the political parties dominated the process. Politicians are using all their connections and are lobbying some projects either themselves or using professional lobbyists in order to collect more voices for the projects they support, which may disadvantage other participants. It is in line with the Uddin et al. (2017), where the political parties are lobbying some projects to be included in the budget. From the 2019 deputies have to disclose their connections with the projects they support.

There are situations where some of the teams are earning money using PB. One of the key features of their projects, which are serial (more than 300 in 2018, from which 43 have won) is that in order to realise them specific services must be provided. These services can be provided only by the authors of the projects since only they have the unique IT platform for that. It is going to be expensive for others to develop it since the authors already had it before. Their projects had been rejected by the working groups but were 'saved' by PB commission in which they were members at that time and had lots of friends in it. So, the issue of conflict of

interest has taken place, even though they declared it. For 2019 they are no longer members of PB commission so that that situation might change.

All these issues including lobbyism, political influence, the possibility of personal gain, and conflict of interest indicate that there should be some control in order to sustain dialogue, because of its absence there is a monologue. There are lots of conflicts between different actors regarding the issues outlined above and other personal problems. Authorities try to resolve them organising debates with both parties of the conflict, thus, using the interactive system of control. The last question that was asked concerned whether the actors have any feeling that somebody is leading them through the whole process of PB. Roughly half of the interviewees said that they have such fillings either strong or slight, which indicates that there is a sort of the banking approach (Brown, 2009) which means that even using dialogic means people are guided to a *'pre-identified right answer'*.

Therefore, the case of Kyiv shows that in reality, democratic innovative tools such as PB where there are many people involved became a sort of quasi-market or a sort of gaming platform where citizens participate in creating projects. It becomes not about the dialogue between citizens and administration but about gaming or winning in the competition.

Such observations can be explained by the intricate relation between control and dialogue in PB. Boundary, interactive or beliefs systems of control are applied for some of the elements of dialogue. Quite paradoxically, there are situations where the existence of such control helps to sustain dialogue rather than limits it. An excellent example of that is breaking of some previously existed regulations or laws in order to accept some projects that are valuable for the city to the voting process. The presence of control, in some cases, limits the dialogue and creates a monologic situation as it is observed in the process of formation of topics of the dialogue that are bounded by the authorities. However, situations where there is a lack of control, and it limits the dialogue are as well observed.

There are plenty of examples outlined, such as usage of PB for the personal gain, conflict of interests, lobbying, lack of time for authorities for verification of projects and others. There should be some sort of control in order to avoid such issues and to sustain dialogue. Finally, there are situations where control is absent, but the dialogue is present. Such an element of dialogue as a forum is not controlled at all, and it seems that dialogue is present there.

## 6. Conclusion

### 6.1 Summary of the study

This research has studied the role and the meaning of control dimension in the PB and its influence on the dialogic potential of PB. It was carried out gradually, step-by-step. At first, I have analysed essential concepts and components that underpin the relevant theory to the problem. I described what PB is, its spread in the world, and the rhetoric and practices of it (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014; Fung, 2015). I outlined main theoretical approaches that have been used to analyse PB from different perspectives (Aleksandrov et al., 2018; Célérier & Botey, 2015; He, 2011; Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016). While those perspectives acknowledge that control seems to play an essential role in shaping democratic/dialogic means of PB, only a few attempts were made for empirical examination of relations between control and dialogue dimensions of PB.

My motivation was to contribute to the theory of dialogic means of PB based on the dialogic framework of Rajala and Laihonen (2019), bringing the control dimension (Simons, 1995) into it. In order to do so, I have used empirical data which consists of the case study of the city of Kyiv, where I have collected perceptions on dialogue and control of different involved in the PB process actors. An exciting and unexpected moment of my research – is in empirical findings. Examining the perceptions of involved actors, I have obtained interesting results which are contrary to the expectations and assumptions of literature. The research question of my thesis was: *'What kind of control is exercised in the PB process and how it shapes PB dialogic means?'*

Key findings of my research are that the PB process in Kyiv is different from the literature and in particular theoretical model developed in the Literature review section. All elements of dialogue either slightly or significantly differ from what is said in the literature. Despite all the dialogic rhetoric of PB, it seems that it is not about dialogue, but more about the competition, some kind of a quasi-market or game (Aleksandrov et al., 2018). Through the lens of the elements of

dialogue, it seems to be even more problematic. However, PB process in Kyiv has several positive outcomes, such as increase in trust between citizens and authorities, increase in the level of communication between citizens and authorities, increase in the power of citizens in the decision-making process (Cooper et al., 2006; Hadden & Lerner, 2011; Lerner, 2011). Moreover, it was found that PB helps to save budgetary funds, which are spent much less efficiently during the ordinary activities of the local administration.

When it comes to the control dimension of PB, the main types of control exercised during the PB process in Kyiv are boundary and interactive control systems with a slight usage of beliefs systems (Simons, 1995). Some elements of dialogue in the PB process in Kyiv are slightly or moderately controlled, whereas others are overcontrolled or not controlled at all.

My research also shows that there is a quite complex interaction between control and dialogue. Therefore, it is challenging to answer how control shapes the dialogic means of PB since my study shows that there are different types of control exercised. There are different ways of how control shapes and sometimes not shape the dialogic means of PB. There are elements of dialogue such as forum that are not controlled, and the dialogue is present, and quite paradoxically there are elements that are controlled such as interactive system regarding the topics, and the dialogue is present as well. Moreover, there is an issue of lack of control in some cases which limits dialogue. It is a paradox of democracy; everything should be opened and not controlled, but it leads to the issues of lobbying, conflict of interest, that the same people are winning each year. Yes, the dialogue is about democracy, but in order to sustain it, some sort of control is needed. Thus, in reality, it is not possible to sustain dialogue without using the control, since lots of paradoxes are in place.

Overall, my theoretical contribution is that I try to fill the gap in the literature about why there is a mismatch between rhetoric and practice in PB (Aleksandrov et al., 2018; Célérier & Botey, 2015; He, 2011; Uddin et al., 2017;

Velinov & Kuruppu, 2016). It is happening because there is also an element of control, but nobody tried to measure it. I found out that the elements of control are present in the PB process, and they shape the dialogic means of PB. Some elements of control limit dialogue, but at the same time, some of them can be fruitful and sustain dialogue in PB. Moreover, absence or lack of control may lead to the point where there is no dialogue but a monologue.

My practical contribution is that practitioners should be aware of how they apply the control dimension into the PB process. The case of Kyiv is quite complicated, there are lots of different actors involved, and all of them exercise some elements of control. However, when I ask about control, people usually say that there is no control, but it is not the case. Control exists, and some things should be controlled, and others should be done without any control. My research shows that for example, there is a domination of some topics, and the problem is that it is quite hard to bring new topics and promote new ideas. There is innovativeness rhetoric, but at the same time, there is no control that helps to create such innovativeness. There is also an issue of domination of some participants who win each year. There should be some sort of control in order to avoid such situations.

## 6.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research

As with any study, this thesis has its limitations. The scope of this study is limited to the case study of the City of Kyiv. Due to time and financial constraints, I have interviewed ten people. It would have been better to include opinions from more citizens, but I believe that for my topic, enough representation is retained.

For further research, it would be interesting to study what elements of control regarding PB exists in other countries with other traditions and take more cases. It would be as well relevant to study how much control is needed in order to sustain dialogue in PB (Aleksandrov et al., 2018). It might be as well an issue of education, so further research might try to understand how to educate about control dimension in PB, so people would be aware what types of control are

needed and what types are not. It would be as well exciting to study how elements of control are changing with time since each year there are new things brought to the process. Should the control be exercised more or less in time? Are there any changes in the type of control exercised from year to year?

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## Schedule and the main steps of MOPP

| № | Period | Results | Stage |
|---|--------|---------|-------|
| 1 | 27.11.18-16.01.19 | Choosing a topic, making a review of its background; Delivering the presentation of my research. | |
| 2 | 17.01.19 | 1st MOPP seminar, presenting and discussing the topic, research question, theory and data collection strategy. | |
| 3 | 18.01.19-13.03.19 | Taking into consideration all the remarks and pieces of advice from the all involved in the 1st seminar and my supervisor; Reading relevant papers on PB topic and writing the theoretical part; Reformulating research question and search for the relevant theory; Getting contacts with informants and preparing the topics for conversation with them; Delivering the progress of my research. | Thematizing and designing |
| 4 | 14.03.19 | 2nd MOPP seminar, presenting the progress and getting relevant comments. | |
| 5 | 15.03.19-15.04.19 | Reflecting on the comments and making some changes to the theoretical and methodological part; Finalising the interview guide and conducting the interviews; | and Interviewing transcribing |
| 6 | 15.04.19- | Meeting with the supervisor | |

| 7 | 16.04.19-19.05.19 | Writing the empirical part and conclusion; Meetings with the supervisor; Finalising the Master thesis; | Analysing and verifying |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8 | 19.05.19 | Delivering the MOPP | Reporting |

**Main actors of the PB process in Kyiv**

| Actors | Description of the main responsibilities |
|---|---|
| Citizens-participants | All citizens older than 14 years old who are engaged in the creating of the projects that will be partially implemented (based on the voting process) the following year. |
| City working group (mainly high-level public managers) | It is appointed by the Kyiv City State Administration (KCSA) and consists of people who are mostly high-level public managers and who work in the different departments of KSCA or Kyiv City Council (KCC) on the top positions.<br><br>It is responsible for organising, shaping and moderation of the whole PB process on each stage; coordination and control of district working groups; appointing the responsible people for the IT platform; development of the PB process for the following year; organising the public deliberations on city-level projects. |
| District working groups (middle-level public managers) | They are appointed by District State Administrations (ten districts) and consists of middle-level (district level) public managers.<br><br>They are responsible for direct communication with citizens-participants; verification of the projects of citizens-participants whether they are not violating the law; organising the public deliberations on district-level projects. |
| Managers of departments in KSCA or the communal enterprises | Public managers who work in different departments of KCSA or in the communal enterprises that are responsible for the allocation of budget funds. Regarding the PB process, they are responsible for the verification financial aspects of the projects, whether they are prepared right and can be implemented with the stated budget. |

| PB commission (members of NGOs) | It is elected annually by the citizens who live in the city and have a right to vote (there are some limits discussed in the next sections). It wholly consists of the members of NGOs, It is responsible for the public control of the whole PB process whether it is implemented right; consideration of disputes; approving the projects that have been rejected by the public managers of the departments in KCSA; resolving the ethical issues. |
| --- | --- |

**Information about interviewees**

| № | Informants | Type of interview | Date/Duration/Place |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Member of NGO, responsible for the implementing of PB in Kyiv in 2016 | Skype interview | Date: 25.02.2019 Duration: 47 min |
| 2 | Citizen-participant in 2018-2019 | Face-to-face interview | Date: 12.04.2019 Duration: 1 h 15 min Place: His workplace |
| 3 | Citizen-participant in 2018 | Phone interview | Date: 15.04.2019 Duration: 1 h 15 min |
| 4 | Public manager in KCC, member of City working group in 2018-2019, citizen-participant in 2016 | Face-to-face interview | Date: 16.04.2019 Duration: 45 min Place: Local administration |
| 5 | Public manager in KCSA, member of City working group in 2018-2019, citizen-participant in 2016 and 2017 | Face-to-face interview | Date: 16.04.2019 Duration: 1 h 30 min Place: Local administration |
| 6 | Public manager in the Secretary of KCC, citizen-participant in 2017 and 2018 | Face-to-face interview | Date: 17.04.2019 Duration: 20 min Place: Local administration |
| 7 | Deputy assistant, member of PB commission in 2016-2018, citizen-participant in 2016 and 2017 | Face-to-face interview | Date: 17.04.2019 Duration: 23 min Place: Local administration |

| 8 | Head of City working group in 2016-2018, member of City working group in 2019, member of NGO responsible for implementing PB in 2016 | Face-to-face interview | Date: 20.04.2019 Duration: 50 min Place: Cultural public hall (Kyiv) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | Head of PB school, citizen-participant in 2016 and 2017 | Face-to-face interview | Date: 20.04.2019 Duration: 22 min Place: Cultural public hall (Kyiv) |
| 10 | Member of PB commission in 2019, citizen-participant in 2016-2019 | Face-to-face interview | Date: 20.04.2019 Duration: 40 min Place: Cultural public hall (Kyiv) |

*Before the interview, each informant received the following message:*

English version:

Good afternoon, I am a student of Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University, and also study at Nord University in Norway. Person X, whom I have already interviewed, gave me your contact, and said that you were one of the participants in the participatory budgeting in Kyiv. I am researching participatory budgeting in Kyiv, in particular about the dialogic dimension of it and control dimension. Could you meet with me in order to discuss several aspects, namely: 1) Your understanding of what is a PB dialogue on the example of Kyiv; 2) The purpose of the public budget and elements of dialogue; 3) The concept of control and its use throughout the process. Your opinion as a participant in this process is very important to me. I will be very grateful if you can talk to me soon. The interview will last approximately 40-60 minutes. If you wish, your contact details will not be listed in the study, and anonymity of your personal data is guaranteed.

Ukrainian version:

Добрий день, я студент КНУ імені Шевченка, а також наразі навчаюсь по програмі подвійного диплому в Норд Університеті в Норвегії. Ваш контакт мені дала Особа X, з якою я вже провів інтерв'ю, сказала, що Ви є одним із учасників громадського бюджету в місті Києві. Я наразі займаюсь науковим дослідженням бюджету у часті в Києві, а саме складової діалогу, його елементів, а також контролю. Чи не могли б Ви зі мною зустрітись, щоб обговорити декілька аспектів, а саме: 1) Ваше розуміння, що таке діалог у громадському бюджеті на прикладі Києва; 2) Мета громадського бюджету та елементи діалогу; 3) Поняття контролю та його здійснення під час всього процесу. Мені дуже важлива Ваша думка, як учасника даного процесу. Буду дуже вдячний, якщо Ви зможете поспілкуватись зі мною найближчим часом, та виділити 40-60 хвилин. Якщо Ви забажаєте, то Ваші контактні дані не будуть зазначені у дослідженні, а Вам гарантується анонімність.

**Interview guide**

Giving some description of my research study to informant:

PB supposes that its core principles are based on open deliberation and democratic principles of citizen's voice, but it is not always the case since we also have some frames of public sector, budget, education and time limits. So, the PB as a process is framed in some way.

1. Can you give your opinion about the main principles of PB in Kyiv as a deliberation\dialogue arena with clear choices and how this arena is framed and why?

   Purpose and topic of dialogue in PB:

2. What are the purposes of the dialogue in PB?

3. How would you describe discussions about topics in PB? Don't you have any feeling that during these discussions there are some frames put by somebody? Can you provide any example?

Participants, forums, and time span:

4. Who participates in the discussions about the purposes and topics of PB and citizens' projects? Can you name any restrictions regarding the possible participants? Do you think that this process is restricted enough, or you would like to introduce something else? Alternatively, vice versa, you want to make it more open and without limitations?

5. Based on your own experience, don't you think that during the whole PB process, some participants are missing? Are all the necessary participants present? Why or why not?

6. When, where, and in what forums are conversations/discussions about the PB project take place? How is it organised from the perspective of local administration?

Dialogue method:

7. What kind of different interpretations/views regarding the PB process are typically available? Whether and how dialogue is moderated? Should it be open debates or somebody should control that? Don't you think it may limit the discussion?

8. Can you reflect on the issues of equality? What do you think about the process and space for different views, thoughts and assumptions during deliberations? Do listening, voicing of the thoughts, suspending the assumptions, respecting others and equality among the participants occur?

9. What are the most typical conflicts, and why do they occur? In your experience, were there some conflicts when it comes to deliberation in the PB process? How do you resolve them?

10. What other challenges connected with dialogue in PB you faced and want to add? Taking into consideration the examples of the PB process in some other countries, there are thoughts that there is a sort of leading to some ideas that some participants exercise on other actors. Do you feel any element of leading some idea from the administration or moderator? Do you feel that the whole PB process is framed?