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Between Past and Future in Religious Education.

The Categorical Answer

Abstract: The article takes as point of departure the current discussions concerning selection of topics in schools. What kind of place should for instance contemporary issues and incidents play, such as acts of religiously motivated terror? In a discussion of future religious education in secular schools, the article brings in viewpoints forwarded by Hanna Arendt, in particular her notion of natality. Arendt argued that schools are not meant to prepare youngsters to handle the present and future needs in a direct and activist way. I take Arendt to be generally right, although there are differences between her situation in the USA and our present plural one in Europe. If we follow Arendt the next generation must be educated much more generally and against the background of accepted knowledge and historical examples. I'll argue that a solution lies within the German Bildung-tradition and its categorical way of thinking school subjects and implicit methods in exemplary themes. Teaching tolerance is given as an example for how a categorical program may function today. There is a slight, but vital difference between "making children responsible" and "to teach them to take responsibility". The article concludes by stating that this difference is a difference of mode rather than of content.

1. Introduction: Contemporary Incidents and Selection of Future School Topics

How are we to prepare young people for an unknown future through religious education? My approach for answering this question lies within the philosophy of education and the study of curriculum theory, and more specifically, to debates concerning the selection of appropriate school topics generally, and religious education and especially its intrinsic methods. Here, religion, and similarly religious education, are taken in a wide and functional sense, which may include secular forms of worldviews and life philosophies. My point of focus will be the situation in secular schools, such as the one we now see in Norway's state schools. Similar secular school systems can be found in the other Scandinavian countries, in Canada and in the United Kingdom, and even more so in the French *laïciste* schools.

My discussion will be principal in matter, and draw on ideas from Hannah Arendt. Arendt articulated ideas that are still debated, but not yet well adopted in studies of religious education. Her view represents an almost counterintuitive solution to the question of topical selection and teaching for the future. Among other claims, she argued that educators should be reluctant to accept schools as a place for political activism. Similarly, there is an ongoing discussion in Norway

italics: laïciste

at the moment, as in other European countries, regarding core elements or big ideas and a reduction of topics or subjects in schools, including the subject of religious education. In particular, one specific problem has been raised in the debate: To what degree should particular incidents in the near past be designated in the curriculum, and thereby necessarily presented and discussed in classrooms?

This debate (par. 2) is well suited as a background for my interpretation of Arendt (par. 3) and her relevance for the discussion of a religious education for the future (par. 4). Her solutions are intriguing in many ways. However, I will argue that there are problems with them in our present religious situation. It is essential to be aware of the fact that the educational discussion is part of a larger discussion in Europe on the function and overall aim of schooling and schools as institutions. In order to further grasp this, and on that ground to discuss possible justifications of Arendt's claims, I will bring in theoretical solutions from the theories of so-called "categorical thinking" related to questions of religious and secular worldviews as school topics. Several answers to the initial question of education for the future, particularly from German *Bildung* scholars, go at least as far back to the aftermath of the French Revolution. The article concludes by presenting ideas for the teaching of tolerance (par. 6) and a more general solution built on Arendt's view that I have named "a difference in mode", a theory that also all in all supports Arendt's theory in relation to religious education (par. 7), referring to the difference between giving responsibility and learning responsibility.

2. Contemporary Incidents and Selection of School Topics

The current curriculum in the Norwegian schools for religious education, *KRLE*, includes knowledge of Christianity in its universal and local forms, other world religions, new religious movements, secular worldviews, general philosophy and ethics (KRLE 2015). Schools teach this subject through the entire primary and secondary levels. It is a compulsory, two-hour study each week, with exemption only for activities, and not for the stated learning outcomes.

For more than 20 years, the main idea of this curriculum has been that children must learn about all of these traditions, including Norwegian Christian ones in particular, to build up an understanding of the present cultural situation and understanding that seems to be a prerequisite for a tolerant attitude (KRLE 2015, Introduction):

Knowledge of Christianity, Religion, Philosophies of Life and Ethics as a generally educative subject shall form the basis for a common platform for greater knowledge and as a frame of reference, and shall help the pupil gain new insight and allow for dialogue that is adapted to the various ages and year levels.

From 2017–2019, there has been- and continues to be a common discussion concerning all school subject curricula initiated by the Norwegian government in order to limit the number of topics. The implicit definition of religion in the Norwegian KRLE subject is a wide one, and seen from the formulations of the curriculum every answer to the great existential questions is religious in some sense. To operate freely in the teaching of every topic of the subject, the difference between various definitions of religion is informative as a general insight needed to guide the challenges of the learning situation.

One particular Norwegian incident, the terror attack of 22 July 2011, was a subject for the discussion. In this attack, 77 persons were killed in Oslo and on the island of *Utøya* by a far right-wing extremist. The attack was the worst terrorist action in Norway since the Second World War. It was particularly severe since the terrorist wanted to kill young people, the next generation, who were gathered for political discussions during a summer camp arranged by the Labour Party's youth organisation (AUF "Arbeidarane si ungdomsfylking", i.e. "The Workers' Youth League"). This is definitely an incident that seems paradigmatic for understanding not only Norway today, but also Europe in general, for understanding struggles connected to immigration, racism, tolerance, equity and democracy (cf. Wergeland Center 2017). For these reasons, the terror attack seems to be an example of themes suitable in schools. The whole event and the subsequent discussion have also been connected to religious worries. It seems natural that the terrorist's motives and religious, political and societal conditions should also be examined in classrooms for the sake of forming a future democratic society.

However, it is also an incident much debated as an example of a topic one should *avoid* mentioning in curriculum and syllabi texts on learning outcomes.¹ One obvious, practical argument in favour of this view is that the curriculum texts are not meant to be changed too often, and for that reason one should be careful not to mention any present or burning question to avoid frequent updates. In addition, while being important today, how important will it be in 50 years? When the two world wars of the 20th century are not included, or the Holocaust, why should this terror attack be mentioned? Furthermore, the terror attack and its ideological and societal background is an example of a contemporary issue, and not necessarily a future one. Some incidents and examples from the present history may of course have long-term consequences. There are burdensome contemporary issues that may have a clearer future relevance than extreme right-wing, xenophobic terrorism, since they are likely to be more enduring threats. In relation to the question of topical selection, we may differ between issues that

1 For examples of the debate (in Norwegian), see https://www.nrk.no/norge/sanner_-na-skal-22.-juli-omtales-i-norske-laereplaner-1.14133822; retrieved 19 December 2018.

have a more or less certain future relevance and those that are more uncertain, or only possibly indirectly relevant.

One core topical element in that category of certain relevance is the question of *sustainable development*. This element is now defined as one of the key cross-thematic issues for all school subjects in Norway, together with the question of citizenship. Children are often engaged by this question. For example, in December 2018, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) met in Katowice, Poland, and a group of children also participated from the “Norwegian climate agents”, *Miljøagentene*. The children contributed to the conference, actively arguing for a change in direction aimed at avoiding or reducing the effects of major climate change. In Sweden, a young girl (Greta Thunberg) inspired other youngsters in several European countries to arrange school strikes to highlight climate change.² (However, there is a difference between schools’ political purpose and political commitment.) There are several examples of political programmes to help schools, directed to solve present problems by children themselves, multiplied by the facilities presented by the Internet and digital text “books”. Future problems and challenges are not completely unknown, but rather just anonymous, i.e., typical in matter (cf. below).¹

My answer to the question of how to prepare children for the future therefore takes *another* route with other criteria. As a point of departure, I will use a discussion brought forward by Hannah Arendt in *Crisis in Education* (2006).

3. Not to Instruct Them

In many ways, Arendt directly answers my initial question on topic selection. While arguing against progressive education in the USA, she claimed that schools are not meant to prepare youngsters to solve future challenges and problems by giving them the responsibility to solve present ones. One must be careful in school not to burden the next generation in a such a way, she reasoned. Both aims and topics in school are to be much more general and historical in character, contrary to many of the above-mentioned school programmes and discussions of incidents in the near past.

It was in the book, *Between Past and Future* (2006), that Arendt published her school theory, “The Crisis in Education”. Part of the crisis referred to is the sense of disaster that emerged in the USA as a reaction towards the first Soviet rocket shot into outer space in 1957. As a result, schools were to emphasise the process of inquiry and independent thinking, laboratory science was stressed, as well as a hands-on learning approach. The feeling of shock was perhaps similar to the

2 <https://miljoagentene.no/nyheter/skolestreik-for-klimaet-article7739-6.html>; retrieved 15 March 2019.

feeling in European and American schools when the first Pisa results from the OECD were published in the early 21st century. Arendt used the opportunity in the essay to attack the prevailing progressive educational ideology in American schools as an example of a way of modernist thinking that she thought was the root problem. She found three principal issues in this kind of pedagogical thinking that she thought aggravated the situation (1958, pp. 177–179).

First, she argued against the view that the world of children is autonomous and basically different from the world of grown-ups, since we share the same world (p. 177). The attitude that because the children's world is so particular that grown-ups should not interfere with it at all has had some severe effects, she claimed. One effect is that when children are allowed to act in whatever way they want, and learn without any involvement from grown-ups, they are also left to the mercy of their comrades, which easily becomes a rule and tyranny by the majority. The role of grown-ups, such as teachers, should therefore not be reduced to "distant supervisors".

Second, she argued that teaching cannot be reduced to procedural techniques or to a science of teaching (p. 178). Hence, she also argued against the standpoint that children should primarily teach themselves. Furthermore, she maintained that in the interference with children the teacher must properly master the topics in question. Her view in fact concerns the legitimate authority of teachers, as the teacher cannot just be "one hour ahead" or learn a topic together with the students. Likewise, teacher education cannot be reduced to the professional training of techniques and procedures.

Third, she reasoned that learning cannot be reduced to a mere doing. If learning was just a performance, one would not need teachers with substantial knowledge, just knowledge of some governing principles (p. 179). To teach and learn is a substantial business, which means that an ability to learn only comes out as a side-effect of the actual learning of something. The formal ways of learning are not more valuable than the material ones (*ibid.*). The idea corresponds to the idea that learning is to be done by playing, which is often used as the essential part of the definition of childhood. Without being against play in general, she argued that a school's task is to transmit the child from the childhood world of play (p. 180).

Here, she brought forth one of her central ideas and concepts, the *natality* of human kind. As children, we were all new to the world, and it is exactly because every generation is new that changes are made possible. "Exactly for the sake of what is new and revolutionary in every child, education must be conservative", she concluded (p. 189). Thus, her argument is not that of a classical pedagogical conservatism. As Gordon (2001) points out, Arendt combines conservatism and liberalism in an innovative and surprising way. The idea is that if the child is not presented to the world, it will lose contact with it, and will then not be able to change it. On the one hand, one shall not treat children as if their lives and their

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world existed autonomously from the grown-up world. On the other hand, one should treat them as if they were grown-ups. The school represents the world, but it *is* not the world; instead, it is a place somewhere in the middle. A teacher should be looked upon as someone who stands as a mediator between the old world and the new one. The teacher is supposed to teach “what the world is like and *not to instruct them* in the art of living” (p. 192, my emphasis, cf. Higgins 2010, who argues that Arendt’s school view is that of mediating, see ~~the~~ last paragraph).

Interpretations of her article and the connection to her major works like *Human Condition* (Arendt 1989) are manifold, even before the turn of the former century. She was looked upon as a marginal thinker, but became more and more appreciated after her death (cf. Canovan 1992). Biesta (2010) is among those who are sceptical of her solutions regarding democratic education. He argues that she is building on an idea of “developmentalism” or is psychological, when she said that schools should not be political, since children are not mature political beings. However, as I see it, this argument could also be seen as a school theory. This means that she did not say that children should be raised apolitically, or that schools have another purpose. Nonetheless, teachers shall take another distinctive position or attitude towards political affairs in their meetings with the children in order to gain a plurality. The Arendtian idea of the human condition as an existence in *plurality* is shared by many scholars today (cf. Todd 2011). The pluralist perspective poses its own challenges for teachers in relation to truth claims in impartial or neutral teaching in religious education, though these are challenges that will not be pursued here (cf. Fuglseth 2017).

Following Arendt, the next generation must be educated generally, but not based on the present day’s situation, problems and possible solutions, as we often see nowadays (cf. the first top paragraph). Is this a solution that also holds for religious education? For instance, does it follow that in order to prepare children for the future religious world, one must be careful to point more to the learnings of the past than to the present?

4. Arendt’s Perceptions as Principles for Future RE?

Basically, I think *Arendt is right* where it comes to her general claim on political education in schools, at least as I have interpreted her work: Teachers, helped by the syllabus, should gently introduce children to the world, but not by instructing them in certain ways of protest or by use of a political programme. The school is not a place for pure “action” in Arendt’s political sense of the word, as in political activism. In fact, this claim follows from the basic challenges that encompass all liberal thinking, articulated in what has been called the pedagogical and liberal dilemma; liberalism also has its limits (cf. the Norwegian philosopher, Hans Skjervheim 1968). Is it at all possible to transfer this discussion and Arendt’s

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arguments to a discussion of the teaching of religions in secular schools today? The question faces three problems: the problem of the generality of her thesis, the problem of formulations in school syllabi and the problem of societal changes regarding religions.

First, her arguments are based on the situation in the USA in the 1950s, meaning that they are not necessarily suitable to the present situation in general. Arendt's view was developed in another time period, and was initiated by the American situation. However, it includes also a general theory about the relationship between generations, a task that is in itself a stable one and also points to an accelerated reality. With globalisation, more and more topics are locally actualised for school learning and criteria, as the ones Arendt brought forward for topical selection become more and more urgent and necessary to settle in one way or the other.

Second, the problem is pedagogical in a practical way. Arendt's solution is not concerned with actual teaching in class and practical arrangements. Discussing pedagogical principles is different from the actual teaching and discussion of appropriate methods. One cannot avoid using examples in the classroom since learning is always a learning of *something*, as Arendt also maintained. Her assertion denotes a general theory, and we need to transfer this general theory to school subjects. This also holds good for the teaching of religions in secular schools, where one might be tempted to limit oneself to find formal learning outcomes and core ideas in order to neutralise a conflict of interests between groups present in the local community (cf. Fuglseth 2017).

Third, based on the first two, her programme does not help regarding criteria. On the basis of Arendt's theories, we are lacking substantial criteria for the selection of school topics, including in religious education. She did not discuss religious education and the teaching of religions as such in her essay from 1958 (contrary to *The Human Condition* from that same year, in which religion is part of her discussion). In order to select core ideas in religions, one needs to understand the situation of religions today. One basic difference between the 1950s and the present global situation is the relative weaker position of secularisation with its political consequences and impact, as well as secularism in the ideological, *laïciste* sense. As Peter Berger argued in his last book (Berger 2014), *The Many Altars of Modernity*, secularisation is a Western movement that has been replaced by pluralisation. One significant claim by Berger was that secularisation comes as an intrinsic part of the package of modernity. Worldwide, there is no modernity without secularisation. However, since religion did not disappear in modern times, one may say that religion came as an extrinsic package. Modernity leads to secularisation to various degrees, but it does not make religion totally vanish. From a global point of view, the present modern world is marked by a double

plurality, between secular and religious alternatives on the one side and between different religious alternatives on the other, as Berger points out.

The kind of phenomenological informed theory of religion by Berger was developed by Thomas Luckmann as early as the 1960s, in a way that may be helpful for finding stable elements of religious beliefs and practices. Luckmann (1967, 1991) argued that secularisation leads to a shrinking of transcendencies, rather than a vanishing of religions *per se*. He saw a tendency in Western societies to go from a situation of a dominant institutionalised religious world, and in particular Christian churches with their “big transcendencies”, to a society with a less institutionalised religious life, and to a middle world of transcendencies (intersubjective, interrelation-based organisations and associations) and finally to low transcendencies (personal, subjective, ego-centred, well-being, etc.). Combining the theories of Berger and Luckmann we may say that there is not less religious activity or altars in modernity, there are just altars of a different kind. This plural situation is more obvious today than in Arendt’s days, and is a major difference between our present situation and the 1950s. Nevertheless, the many modern altars is a new situation, but a new situation in which Arendt’s solution for schools are more actual than ever before. There are many religious choices and solutions available in our contemporary world, with a more central problem of this steadily pluralising situation seeming instead to protect some type of social cohesion. Therefore, we also need to face this double pluralism in secular schools in one way or the other.

This is not an argument against Arendt and her school theory, but presents problems of her theories that need to be solved in our present situation. Her view that teaching and learning not only carry formal aspects, but always comes with some content or specific subject matter, is a well-known argument from German *Bildung* theories, in particular emphasised by Wolfgang Klafki (see below), a tradition Arendt might have known. Combining them solves several theoretical problems in relation to our initial question of an education for the future. Expressions of learning outcomes are of special interest. For religious education, this means that as valuable as they might be, expressions like the “understanding” or “exploration” of religion as learning outcomes need to be materialised either in the learning outcomes, in the curriculum itself or in the classroom. To “understand” religion, one needs to work with the understanding of specific themes, such as miracles in the Bible or the Koran.

What is less known today is perhaps the insistence of Klafki and others on the categorical way of formal material thinking that came about as a result of their investigations. I shall bring in two aspects of teaching to the discussion of future challenges, which might have moderated Arendt’s views and also made it more practical, namely the role of categorical teacher thinking and the question of sources of knowledge.

5. Categorical Thinking and Other *Bildung* Solutions

Several principal solutions have been presented for making learning material denser in order to limit the scope of themes in schools generally, without making any qualitative reduction for the formation or *Bildung* (see e.g. Lerner 2012). One solution concerns the categorical *Bildung* theory, primarily from Wolfgang Klafki (1927–2016). The idea is that in order to limit the scope of subjects, one should focus on the possible categories that examples refer to (Klafki 1963, cf. 1964, 1993). In planning for teaching and learning, one must be aware of these possible categories. For instance, reading *Anne Frank's Diary*, attention and potential learning will not only be about the life of Anne Frank, but we may also be aware of categories like anti-Semitism or racism in general, and thus be able to recognise new examples of the same category in the past and future by ourselves without further instructions from others. In this way, education may be more complete and deeper without having an overload of examples and subject matters. The teachers who plan and govern teaching activities should attempt to create insights into one or several of the intrinsic categories of each example.

This is a descriptive theory since building categories cannot be avoided or planned exactly, as maintained by the social relevance theory of Austrian-American social philosopher Alfred Schütz (1899—1959). In line with his phenomenological ground, Schütz argues (1981, 2003) that experience is structured in our stock of knowledge according to its relevance for us in upcoming events. Schütz' relevance theory is in one way a learning theory (cf. Fuglseth 2018). One insight proposed by Schütz is that individual and collective planning is always typical in matter, i.e., anonymous. All our plans for future actions or non-actions are always based on action *types* or combination of types of action. In school education, learning essential types through key examples is therefore paramount.

According to the Klafki procedures, the categories come as a result of the meeting between the teacher and the pupil, and for that reason can only be partially planned. The pupils may not be aware of the categories they have constituted, but it is deeply learned. It also means that the recommendable categories are conceivable outcomes, though never ensured.

Being a descriptive process, it may be studied empirically and measured in some way. There are several methodical problems connected to any such study of *Bildung* research in general (cf. Benner 2008; for a later discussion of Klafki, see Meyer & Meyer 2007). The categorical planning presupposes ideas of the elements in the subjects studied, and also that these again relate to some kind of basics in every human being that can be reached in the so-called double opening: to open the world for the pupil and the pupil for the world (Klafki 1963, p. 61). This perspective on material-formal learning is lacking in Arendt's presentation, but it is certainly not anything that opposes her general theory, rather, it develops

it. Furthermore, this theory solves some of the didactical challenges to her theory described above.

The second aspect is related to the first one, and is the idea that the sources of knowledge in schools cannot be derived from disciplinary knowledge only, such as philosophy, theology, religious studies or sociology. Any school subject is *de facto* built upon several different sources, and they are all transformed in the school context with its educational aims. The school subjects are in need of an everyday life source or context. Religions are not only products like institutions and organisations, such as churches, statues and temples; they also come as a dynamic process. To speak with Husserl, intentionalities can be both a moment or dependent part, and a component or independent part (see the third logical investigation in Husserl 2009; cf. Sokolowski 2000). In relation to the understanding of religion, this means that religions can be both moments and components at the same time. This kind of argument was introduced by Luckmann (1967, 1991) with his idea of *invisible* religion. Where this insight is lacking, several misunderstandings occur, either the claim that there is no such things as religions, or that religious movements by definition only occur when institutionalised. As moments or living processes, religious practices come into classrooms in many ways. In secular schools, one restricts oneself to inform about religions, and no *Bildung* process is the task of schools alone. One aim for this process is that we all are placed between the ignorant and the expert. Schütz called this ideal the well-informed citizen (cf. Schütz 1964), an ideal that certainly involves tolerance. Tolerance is possibly a good example for categorical thinking in teaching preparation in an Arendtian way.

6. Tolerance as an Example of Categorical Thinking

An elementary insight of a tolerant attitude says that it is composed of three values (cf. Embree 2011): 1) my own value (e.g. that leads to an attitude saying “I do eat pork”), 2) my neighbour’s value (“she does not eat pork”), but also 3) the value of tolerance itself—we accept our different values and the points of view and practices they involve. In order to obtain a non-relativist idea of tolerance, one presupposes that all parties accept, understand, judge and practice in different ways, but also that they accept the differences without leaving their initial standpoints and their values. The discussion in relation to religions concerns not only what you eat or wear, but also what the public in general accepts.

Berger and Zijderveld (2009) discuss the necessity of doubt in tolerant and plural societies, pointing to the fact that we have only three possibilities while meeting values other than our own: acceptance, rejection and pluralisation (i.e. accepting the practice, even as legal procedure). In order to make the next generation understand tolerance and act accordingly, all three values must be seized. As individuals and as a society, we continuously differ between these solutions

depending on the issue. When religious practices meet, a similar three-way option demonstrates the elements of tolerance since it also includes non-tolerance. The coaching of tolerance in these matters does not necessarily have to be undertaken by matters that demand tolerance today, but by simpler cases. The values can be made visible in several ways also in a monocultural classroom. A solution to teach the understanding of tolerance is through examples that recreate the dilemmas that tolerance first faced. We may call this the principle of re-enactment, and is a strategy that can easily be connected to the pupil's own everyday life.

Klafki follows Wagenschein (2000) in explaining the categorical effect of stone-throwing for the understanding of the movements of stars. Likewise, I think exercises that enhance the three types of values inhibited in tolerance may have a similar essentialising effect. The proliferation of religious organisations and the double plurality make the selection of topics even more difficult. One reason for using fewer contemporary examples is that in secular societies the children have very few and limited experiences, with practiced religion and the methods of introduction are for that reason not obvious. Little experience among pupils with religions in a plural society is difficult because pupils lack the necessary basis for understanding the horizons. In these cases, the knowledge foundation should be established first.

Recently, the German sociologist Jürgen Habermas (2008) has also presented an argument for including religious understanding into the public discussion, an argument that is also directed to schools, although here schools may play a major role to establish the horizons of particular religious beliefs in matters of a general, political nature (e.g. for question of life and death, see also Jackson 2014; TOLEDO 2007).

7. Summary and Discussion: A Difference of Mode?

Initially, I presented Arendt's solution as a point of departure, with her ideas also forming a basis for my discussion and answer to the overall question of future religious education, not only in Norway, but everywhere with similar school philosophies.

For pedagogical reasons, one main question in the present situation following Arendt's ideas was the use of tragic incidences of the present or near future, such as the terrorist attack in Norway in 2011. Should and can we use present examples of conflicts and disturbing incidents for debate and instruction in school for a common future good? The argument against this way of thinking is that it implicitly easily gives the children themselves responsibility for solving contemporary problems. The attitude indicates that teachers treat children as if they were in charge of the world. However, if we follow Arendt, schools and teachers should only *mediate* between the child and the world. I believe that the political

— makes it

actualising and pushed activism by teachers in school related to incidents as the ones referred to above (par. 2) are short-sighted. We may miss working with the ability of children to meet the future, as Arendt also argues. As starters and new beginners, we will ruin their *natality* in such a way.

Religious conflicts are in fact a very good example today, almost paradigmatically, of the challenges introduced in schools with a sole focus on solving political problems. It seems easier if we follow Arendt and use examples of a less urgent kind, choosing subjects of teaching derived more from the past than the present. Again, these may be applied to the possible future societal changes as categories, anonymous types of actions.

Even so, I think the difference in attitude demanded at present is more a difference of *mode* than in the selection of school topics. I think the modes come to expression in two different strategies, either “to make children responsible” or “to teach them to take responsibility”. It would also be possible to see the practical (didactic) solutions to such a difference of mode in the conversations between teachers and pupils or students. Tolerance in a plural world of religions is an excellent example to demonstrate the principle of mode difference. It is possible to plan for the three involved values of any tolerance in ways that do not engage pupils and students as active politicians, but only to create the ground for them to discover actual solutions. There is an essential distinction in these two attitudes that Arendt in fact offered us all as a solution of the late modern problems of double religious plurality that Peter Berger discussed. For the teacher, it is essential that these values are being taught as forming (*bildende* in German) for the child, but without a direct instruction of actions and without giving them the responsibility for the present world. This is what I would call a categorical answer, as the next generation learns the category and also learns to be aware of its practical consequences without turning the school into a fully religious or political body.

The modes

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