Positioning and negotiations : The case of pharmaceutical pricing
Peer reviewed, Journal article
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Original versionPedersen, P. A. & Grepperud, S. (2020). Positioning and negotiations: The case of pharmaceutical pricing. European Journal of Political Economy, 62: 101853. doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101853
We study a positioning game prior to negotiations where each party invests into influential activities in order to raise voter support for their preferred bargaining outcome. The case chosen for our analysis is a bilateral monopoly where a purchaser meets a pharmaceutical firm and where the two negotiate on the price of a new and innovative medicine. We identify factors that influence on the negotiated price such as treatment effects of the new and the existing drug, production costs of the new drug, the price of the existing drug, the marginal cost of public funds and patient group size. Furthermore, it is shown that the negotiated price, depending on the characteristics of a political cost function with regard to the influential activities, is influenced by the order of moves taken by the parties. Regardless of the strategic interrelationships between the two parties, likely positioning games to be played are those where one of the two negotiating parties acts as a leader while the rival acts as a follower.